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Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud
Computing for Trade Secret Protection
Abstract

As has been noted elsewhere, the advent of digital technology and the Internet has greatly increased the risk
that a company’s trade secrets will be lost through the inadvertent or intentional distribution of such secrets.
The advent of cloud computing adds another dimension to this risk by placing actual or potential trade secrets
in the hands of a third-party: the cloud computing service. This article explores the legal and practical
implications of cloud computing as they relate to trade secret protection.
While there are many types of cloud computing services, this article focuses on cloud-based services that offer
businesses the ability to upload and store information and data remotely via the Internet (hereinafter “cloud
storage services”). The first part of the article discusses the practices of cloud storage services and the current
state of trade secret law in order to identify and explain the risks posed to trade secrets stored in the Cloud. It
begins with an overview of the cloud computing industry, including an examination of the terms of service
agreements used by cloud storage services. After a brief explanation of the requirements for trade secret
protection (with particular emphasis on the reasonable efforts requirement), the article then explains the
third-party doctrine of trade secret law and how that doctrine threatens to waive trade secrecy for information
stored in the Cloud.
Because the analysis of the relationship between cloud storage services and their customers leads to the
conclusion that, at least in the absence of an express or implied-in-fact agreement to the contrary, no duty of
confidentiality is established and trade secrecy is likely to be waived, the article ends by exploring potential
refinements and exceptions to the third-party doctrine of trade secret law. After concluding that no existing
definition of disclosure provides a workable exception to the third-party doctrine of trade secret law, the
article ends with a proposal that the law officially recognize an expanded taxonomy for trade secret law that
recognizes a distinction between trade secrecy destroying “disclosures” and non-trade secrecy destroying
“mere transfers.”
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ABSTRACT
This Article explores whether trade secrets lose
their status as trade secrets by being uploaded to
computer servers owned by cloud service
providers. Although some think this question
can be answered easily by determining if the
information is subject to reasonable efforts to
maintain its secrecy, due to the third party
doctrine of trade secret law and the practices of
cloud service providers, the answer is not so
simple. The third party doctrine, although
somewhat related to the reasonable efforts
requirement, is a distinct concept that cannot be
ignored. After first explaining the scope and
purpose of third party doctrine and how it puts
trade secrets stored in the cloud at risk, the
author proposes a method of analysis for
distinguishing between trade secrecy waiving
"disclosures" and non-trade secrecy waiving
"mere transfers." This Article also provides a
classification scheme for the various types of
disclosure under trade secret law.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past ten years, "cloud computing" has
evolved from a clever yet misunderstood term of art into
a thriving industry featuring all of the big names in the
computer industry, the Internet, and telecommunications
IBM, Microsoft,
Google,
Amazon,
Dell,
-including
and Verizon. Apparently first coined as a term for the
next generation of computer services in 2005,1 the meaning
and scope of cloud computing has been debated.2 Some

1RackSpace claims to have developed the idea in 2005 or at least, embraced
the idea of two unidentified developers. See About Us, THE RACKSPACE
CLOUD,

available

at

https://web.archive.org/web/20090721020002/http://www.rackspacecloud.c
om/aboutus/story (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). At the Web 2.0 Summit in
November 2006, Jeff Bezos announced Amazon's Electric Compute Cloud
service. See Alan Sipress, At Web 2.0 Sunuit, A Look at What's in Store
(and

Storage),

WASH.

POST,

Nov.

9,

2006,

available

at

&

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/ 1/08/AR2006110802094.htnl.
Dell
tried,
unsuccessfully, to trademark the term in 2007. See U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 77139082 (filed Mar. 23, 2007). A company by the
name of NetCentric Corporation applied to register the term "cloud
computing" for use in conjunction with educational services in 1997, but
the application was abandoned for failure to file a statement of use. See U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 75291765 (filed May 14, 1997).
2 In a September 2011 report, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology stated that "[c]loud computing is an evolving paradigm," but
nonetheless defined cloud computing as "a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction." PETER MELL
TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF
COM., THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING

1-2

(2011). The report

goes on to explain the "cloud model is composed of five essential
characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models." Id.
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people define it broadly to include a range of computer services
that are available over the Internet, with "the cloud" simply
being a metaphor for the Internet. 3 Others use the term to
differentiate their services from the broader Internet by, for
instance, focusing on a pay-for-play payment structure or the
provision of discrete services over the Internet, such a
web-hosting, infrastructure-as-a- service, and software-as-aservice.4 Still others refer to

"the cloud"

as a place to

store, retrieve, and use vast amounts of information.5
The focus of this Article is on cloud-based services,
however labeled, that offer businesses the ability to upload and
store information and data remotely via the Internet
(hereinafter "cloud storage services"). This might include backup and processing services akin to earlier service bureaus or
data centers that are specifically designed and marketed to
allow customers to store data. It can also include services that
appear (at least on the surface) to be more benign, such as

3 See Vangie Beal, Cloud Computing (The Cloud), WEBOPEDIA,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/cloud-computing.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2014).
4 See, e.g., Amazon Web Services, What is Cloud Computing, AMAZON
WEB
SERVS.,
available at
http://aws.amazon.coI/what-is-cloudconputing/?sc-channel=PS&sccampaign=AWSFreeTier_20 13&sccou
ntry=US&scpublisher=Google&scmedium=NonbrandCloudComputin
g_B&sccontent=36175397442&scdetail=Clouds
+computing&sc-category=aws-cloud-computing&sc-se (last visited Oct.
19, 2014) ("'Cloud Computing' ... refers to the on-demand delivery of IT
resources and applications via the Internet with pay-as-you-go pricing.").
5 Examples of cloud storage services include Amazon's EC2 service and
Google's Google Docs and GoogleDrive services, as well as companies that
focus on providing storage solutions such as DropBox and RackSpace.
Vol. 19
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Gmail 6 and Sony's PlayStation Network. 7 Indeed, if you use
modem-day technologies such as cellphones, cable television,
and tablet computers, chances are that your service providers
offer the "convenience" of storing a wide-variety of
information that can be remotely accessed via those devices. 8
As touted by many cloud storage services, businesses
around the world can reduce the costs of acquiring and
maintaining their computer systems by storing their documents
and data in the cloud. 9 Significantly, instead of having to

6

See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957, *26-

27 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (describing Gmail and the privacy concerns it
raises).
7 See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,

903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950-51 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (describing the PlayStation
Network and Sony's (then existing) privacy policies).
See

Google

Terns

of

Service,

GOOGLE,

http://www.google.com/policies/terms (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) ("When
you upload, submit, store, send or receive content to or through our
Services, you give Google (and those we work with) a worldwide license to
use, host, store, reproduce, modify, create derivative works (such as those
resulting from translations, adaptations or other changes we make so that
your content works better with our Services), communicate, publish,
publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such content. The rights
you grant in this license are for the limited purpose of operating, promoting,
and improving our Services, and to develop new ones. This license
continues even if you stop using our Services (for example, for a business
listing you have added to Google Maps).").
9
See,
e.g.,
Cloud
Services,
AT&T,
http://www.business.att.com/lenterprise/Portfolio/cloud/?wtPaidSearchTerm
=cloud&wtpdsrchpcmt=cloud&WT.srch= I &source=EENT44MECCekGpl
V4&wtpdsrchprg=Enterprise++Cloud+Services&wtpdsrchgp=ABSSEARCH (last visited Oct. 19, 2014)
("With cloud solutions, IT services are procured on an as needed basis,
rather than procuring capital expense assets. Instead of investing in
equipment, you buy access to cloud computing, cloud storage, platforms
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acquire and maintain an expensive array of centralized servers,
businesses can utilize the server capacity of another that
promises to be available 24/7 and to provide scalable capacity
for all of its clients' needs. An added benefit of these services
is that the stored information can be retrieved anywhere in the
world via the Internet, thereby facilitating the use, sharing, and
editing of information among multiple persons and entities and
across jurisdictional boundaries. What these services do not
always promise, particularly with respect to the so-called
"public cloud," is that the stored information will be
maintained in confidence.' 0 Rather, in order to limit potential

and other resources on demand over the network, likely reducing: capital
investments: IT spend: lengthy turnaround times; service-contract terms").
1o See SIMON BRADSHAW ET AL., QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON, SCH. OF
LAW, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 63, CONTRACTS FOR CLOUDS:
COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CLOUD

COMPUTING SERVICES 21 (2010) ("Our survey found however that most
providers not only avoided giving undertakings in respect of data integrity
but actually disclaimed liability for it."). Perhaps responding to the need for
more security and confidentiality in the cloud, many of the storage services
are careful to differentiate between storage of information in the "public
cloud" and the "private cloud." According to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, the varying cloud deployment models are
defined as follows:
Private cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a
single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). It
may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party, or
some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises.
Conniunity cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use
by a specific community of consumers from organizations that have shared
concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance
considerations). It may be owned, managed, and operated by one or more of
the organizations in the community, a third party, or some combination of
them, and it may exist on or off premises.
Vol. 19
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liability, the form terms of services agreements used by cloud
storage services often disclaim responsibility for the security of
information stored by their customers and are careful not to
make any express promises of confidentiality." This raises the
question: Assuming the information stored in the cloud
includes some trade secrets, to what extent does the use of
cloud storage services undermine the trade secrecy of that
information?
Although businesses have been using third party
vendors for decades to store hard-copies of business records
and to back-up computer data (usually off-site),' 2 no reported
cases were found concerning the consequences of such actions
on the trade secret status of the stored information.' 3 This fact

Public cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the
general public. It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business,
academic, or government organization, or some combination of them. It
exists on the premises of the cloud provider.
Hybrid cloud. The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more
distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain
unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary
technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting
for load balancing between clouds).
MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 3. Significantly for the purpose of this
Article, all four deployment models may involve the storage of information
on the servers of another, including third parties.
" BRADSHAWET AL., supra note 10, at 21-22; see also infra PartIII.
12 See infra text accompanying note 44.
13 A case was found involving competing time-share companies, but it
concerned alleged trade secret misappropriation related to a business
agreement to share software. See Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex,
Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d. 1341 (6th
Cir.
1972);
see also Oshno Int'l
Found.
v. O'Neill,
No.
FSTCV106004365S, 2010 WL 3960802 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2010)
Vol. 19
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may lead some to believe that the answer to the foregoing
question is easy, but there are at least two reasons why the
"old-school" (and continuing) practice of securing or
"vaulting" business documents is not the same as storing them
in the cloud.' 4 First, the primary purpose of data vaulting is to
store information in a remote location as a back-up copy of the
same information stored elsewhere. Although the act of
initiating back-up storage may involve some network
connectivity via the Internet or a private network, it does not
involve the "on demand self-service" and "broad network
access" that the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) says are essential characteristics of cloud computing.' 5
In other words, as used herein, data vaulting does not allow

(involving information stored in a self-storage facility but the case was
decided without discussing the third party doctrine).
14 According to Webopedia, "vaulting" means "the process of sending data
off-site, where it can be protected from hardware failures, theft and other
threats" and is also referred to as "remote back-up services." Data Vaulting,
WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/data-vaulting.htmil (last
visited Oct. 19, 2014).
15 MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2. As described in a 1981 article that
detailed the early history of the computer industry, including the practices
of service bureaus: "In many cases the data to be processed are transcribed
on conventional paper forms and mailed or delivered to the service bureau
on conventional paper forms them and returns the results. But access to the
service bureau computer may be direct via 'modem."' Walter E. Schmidt,
Computer Programs: The American

Experience, 21 Jurimetrics J. 345, 378 (1981).

See also W. KUAN HON

&

Legal Proprietary Interests in

CHRISTOPHER
MILLARD,
CLOUD
COMPUTING
VS.
TRADITIONAL
OUTSOURCING-KEY DIFFERENCES, SOCIAL SCI. RES. NETWORK, available

at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200592 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) ("Current
laws envisage traditional outsourcing and the stand-alone databases in use
when they are drafted. They do not cater adequately for differences arising
from service type, particularly with public shared[-]infrastructure laaS and
PaaS (i[.]e[.,] infrastructure services), or differences arising from individual
services' designs." (footnote omitted)).
Vol. 19
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stored information to be accessed and used on a regular basis
by either the customer or the storage service. 6 This is not the
case with some cloud storage services, many of which reserve
the right to access, and potentially use all or a portion of a
customer's stored information.1 7 Second, unlike many cloud
storage services, companies that provide data vaulting services
are usually willing to make express promises of confidentiality
and security that do not implicate the third party doctrine of
trade secret law, discussed infra. 18 Indeed, for companies that
are under a legal obligation to secure data (including healthcare
and financial institutions), it is the promise of adequate
database security that usually drives the selection of a vaulting
service.1 9 In contrast, what often drives the selection of a cloud

16 As discussed infra, this distinction also explains the limited applicability
of the Stored Communications Act. See infra text accompanying notes 261
& 269.
17 See infra text accompanying note 85.
1 See infra Part II.C. Modern day companies that focus on providing backup services or excess server capacity are willing to provide such promises
but usually at an increased cost over free or low-cost cloud storage
providers. See BRADSHAW ET AL., supra note 11, at 22 ("A small number of
the providers surveyed give more positive assurances. For example,
Salesforce CRM's T&C [Terms & Conditions] state that appropriate
measures will be taken to safeguard customer data. It is interesting to note
that two providers offering specific backup services, Symantec and Iron
Mountain, make no mention of data integrity in their T&C. It may well be
that both providers assume it to be implicit from the nature of their
service.").
19 For data security purposes (as opposed to trade secret and privacy
purposes), legal and industry standards have been (and continue to be)
developed by various private, semi-private, and public institution. See, e.g.,

U.S. NAT'L SEC. AGENCY & U.S. CENT. SEC. SERV., INFORMATION
ASSURANCE
DIRECTORATE: CGS IA POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND
STANDARDS
CAPABILITY
(2012),
available
at

http://iase.disa.nil/cgs/Documents/IAPoliciesProceduresStandardsv.1.
1.1 .pdf: - Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council (SSC)
Vol. 19
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storage service is the ability to quickly and easily access stored
information and to make available or share that information
with multiple individuals both inside and outside a business. 20
While businesses obviously have an interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the information they possess,
there is no general right to keep business information
confidential. Rather, the general rule is that business
information, like all information, is not protected if it is
voluntarily (or in many cases, involuntarily) disseminated to
others. 2 ' Businesses who want to maintain the confidentiality
of their information can always engage in self-help in an effort
to maintain actual secrecy, but if those efforts are insufficient
and their information falls into the hands of another, then the

Data Security Standards Overview,

PCI SEC.

STANDARDS

COUNCIL,

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security-standards/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2014). Whether these measures also suffice for trade secret purposes
would depend upon whether they are "reasonable under the circumstances"
to protect the subject trade secrets.
20 Dropbox is an example of a service that gives multiple people the ability
to share information and collaborate on the formulation of information and
where such collaboration is a key selling point. See DROPBOX,
https://www.dropbox.com/business (last visited Nov. 3, 2014) (touting the
benefit of collaboration).
21 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939) ("The
privilege to compete with others . . . includes a privilege to adopt their

business methods, ideas or processes of manufacture. Were it otherwise, the
first person in the field with a new process or idea would have a monopoly
which would tend to prevent competition."); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§

I cmt. A (1995)

("The freedom to

engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective
customers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise system."); ROGER
M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, I MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.05[2]
(2014) ("The courts do not prevent or punish copying of another's disclosed
ideas unless such copying is prohibited by valid contract, or under patent,
copyright, or trademark law.").
Vol. 19
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only way to stop the further disclosure or use of the
information is to seek relief in a court of law. Generally, this
can be accomplished in one of four ways: (1) by demonstrating
that the information is protected by patent or copyright law, in
which case the use of the information is restricted in
accordance with the exclusive rights of the patent and
copyright owner; 2 2 (2) by proving that the other person is under
a contractual duty to maintain the confidentiality of the
information, in which case the information owner is entitled to
remedies for breach of contract if the information is disclosed
or used in contravention of the terms of the contract; 23 (3) by
establishing that the other person is under a statutory, common
law, or professional duty to maintain the confidentiality of the
information; 24 or (4) by proving that the information is a trade
secret that was misappropriated.
This Article focuses on whether trade secret protection
can be used to protect information that is stored in the cloud

22 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271.
23 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in

Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 300 (1998); Sharon K.
Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Nanze is Still a Contract: Exanzining the
Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119,

124-25 (2005) (detailing the differences between trade secret protection and
protection of information and ideas pursuant to contract). The area of law
referred to as "idea-submission law" is based upon contract law. See
generally Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, I UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 9 (1994).
24 See generally FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Goldman, Sachs & Co. v.
Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (standing for the
proposition that "by a long established and honored rule of the common
law, embodied in the statutes of many states, an attorney should not, and
cannot be, compelled to, testify regarding communications made to him in
his professional character by his client").
25 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1985) [hereinafter UTSA].
Vol. 19
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when the trade secret owner voluntarily and intentionally
initiates an act (or series of actions) that cause such information
to flow 2 6 from its own database

storage facilities to the

database storage facilities of a third party. 27 The focus on
owner-initiated acts distinguishes it from earlier articles that
examined the issue of trade secrecy with respect to accidental
disclosures and disclosures following alleged acts of
misappropriation.2 8 This Article is also distinguishable from

In order not to pre-judge the degree of "disclosure" that occurs when
information is stored in the cloud, the author use the term "information
flow" throughout this Article as a neutral term to refer to the fact that
information has moved from a trade secret owner to a third party. As
discussed infra, whether an information flow constitutes a "mere transfer"
or a "disclosure" depends upon the legal and factual analysis that is detailed
in this Article. See infra Part IV. "Third party," as used in this Article,
loosely means an individual or company that is not affiliated with the trade
secret owner in such a manner that the law would consider their actions to
be that of the trade secret owner. See MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, §
7.02 (defining third parties as "parties who are not in any legally cognizable
relationship with respect to one another except to the extent that use or
disclosure of a trade secret by one of the parties may be argued to be an
actionable wrong by the other"). In reality, however, these so-called "third
parties" are actually "second parties" to the extent they deal directly with
the trade secret owner and, thus, they may be directly liable for trade secret
misappropriation if they owe a duty of confidentiality to the trade secret
owner.
27 In addition to the definition in the preceding footnote, as used herein,
"third party" refers to a person or entity that, in most cases, would not be
one of the parties in a trade secret misappropriation case and, thus, is a
"third party" vis-h-vis the litigants. Similar to what occurs in the Fourth
Amendment context, typically the defendant in a misappropriation case will
point to a third party's possession of information as destroying its trade
secrecy.
26

21 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the

Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1

(2007)
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ones that discuss privacy and security issues related to the
Internet and the cloud because it focuses on the acts of
information owners in transferring valuable business
information to a third party.
Although issues of privacy and security are obviously
implicated by the practice of collecting information in digital
form and storing it in remote locations such as the cloud,
privacy and security issues generally concern the legal
obligations that are (or should be) imposed on companies that
create and maintain large databases of customer information. 29
While these companies would undoubtedly claim that some or
all of the customer information they store constitutes "their"
trade secrets, the stored information that is the focus of this
Article is not limited to customer-related or personally
identifiable information but includes any information that is
within the theoretical scope of trade secret protection. Pursuant
to the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), this can include any
"information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process . . . ."30
Pursuant to a well-established principle of trade secret
law, in order to establish and maintain information as a trade
secret, information owners must engage in efforts that are

particularly with respect to the acts of misappropriation that lead to posting
trade secrets on the Internet).
29 UTSA § 1(4). The number of articles and books on the subject
of
information privacy is too great to list here. See generally DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (N.Y. Univ. Press 2004) (providing a comprehensive

overview of the legal issues related to information privacy, including the
cases and scholarship related thereto); Kevin Cronin, Best Practicesand the
State of Information Security, 84 CHI-KENT L. REV. 811 (2010).
30

UTSA

Vol. 19

§ I (defining "trade secret").
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reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of
the information.31 What is reasonable when a company is
attempting to protect information intra-enterprise is different
from what is reasonable when a company wishes to share
information extra-enterprise. 32 When trade secrets are
"disclosed" to another, what is referred to herein as "the third
party doctrine of trade secret law," 33 there exists a requirement
that the disclosure occur under circumstances that give rise to a
duty of confidentiality. This principle of law presents a
problem for cloud storage services which carefully avoid
promises of confidentiality and disclaim responsibility and
liability for the security of information they store. Without a
binding promise of confidentiality, companies that own trade
secrets arguably waive the trade secrecy of stored information.
This Article begins by exploring the practices of the
cloud storage services and the current state of trade secret law
in order to identify and explain the risks posed to trade secrets
and other proprietary information stored in the cloud. It begins
in Part II with an overview of the current (but ever-evolving)
state of the cloud computing industry, including an
examination of the terms of service agreements used by several
cloud storage services, particularly as they relate to the
confidentiality and security of stored information. A brief
explanation of the requirements for trade secret protection is
provided in Part III, with particular emphasis on the reasonable
efforts requirement. Part IV then explains the third party

31

32

Id.
See generally MILGRIM & BENSEN,

supra note 21, at §§1.04-05

(discussing the maintenance of secrecy intra-enterprise and the loss of
secrecy through external disclosure).
33 There is also a third-party doctrine of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See infra notes 206-214.
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doctrine of trade secret law as applied to the information flows
between trade secret owners and cloud storage services.
Because the analysis of the relationship between cloud
storage services and their customers leads to the conclusion
that, at least in the absence of an express or implied agreement
to the contrary, no duty of confidentiality is established, Part V
of this Article explores potential refinements and exceptions to
the third-party doctrine of trade secret law. It begins by
examining the scope of the third party doctrine under existing
law. Next, the meaning of disclosure under various area of law,
including current trade secret law, is explored. After
concluding that no existing definition of disclosure provides a
workable exception to the third party doctrine of trade secret
law, it is proposed that the law officially recognize a distinction
between trade secrecy destroying "disclosures" and non-trade
secrecy destroying "mere transfers." Borrowing from recent
scholarship concerning the third-party doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment and Professor Daniel Solove's "taxonomy
of privacy," 34 a number of factors are identified for
differentiating between "mere transfers" of information and
"disclosures."
This Article concludes with a proposed four-step
analytical process. First, it should be determined if information
flowed to a third party. This may require an examination of the
relationship between the trade secret owner and the recipient of
the information and whether they are considered part of the
same entity under applicable law. Second, using a number of
factors identified in this Article, the circumstances, nature and

See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477
(2006) (differentiating between information collection, information
processing, information dissemination, and invasion).
3
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scope of the information flow should be examined to determine
if there was a "disclosure" or "mere transfer" of the
information. If there was a disclosure of trade secret
information, then the third and fourth steps require application
of the standard analysis under trade secret law: (1) it must be
determined whether a duty of confidence existed between the
trade secret owner and the third party; and (2) whether the
trade secret owner otherwise engaged in reasonable efforts to
maintain the confidentiality of its information.
II.

THE CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY

A. A Brief History of the Computer Industry
Depending upon who you talk to, cloud computing is
either a revolutionary development or the hyped-up,
repackaging of pre-existing business models. Commenting on
the rush to offer cloud computing services, Larry Ellison
observed:
The interesting thing about cloud computing is that
we've redefined cloud computing to include everything that we
already do. I can't think of anything that isn't cloud computing
with all of these announcements. The computer industry is the
only industry that is more fashion-driven than women's
fashion. Maybe I'm an idiot, but I have no idea what anyone is
talking about. What is it? It's complete gibberish. It's insane.
When is this idiocy going to stop? 35

3 Dan Farber, Oracle'sEllison Nails Cloud Computing, CNET NEWS (Sept.
26, 2008, 12:09 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13953_3-1005218880.html.
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As Amazon's Jeffrey Bezos put it, "We make muck so
you don't have to." 36 Richard Stallman, the guru of the open
software movement, paints a more nefarious picture, arguing
that cloud computing is just another way by which computer
and Internet companies are trying to get businesses locked into
expensive proprietary systems. 37 Actually, there is truth to all
three perspectives.
Anyone who is familiar with service bureaus, timesharing, and data centers knows that the use of remote
computers to process and store information is not new. 38 When
the computer industry began in earnest in the late 1950s, the
focus of many computer companies was on the manufacture
and sale of mainframe computers for data processing use. 39
Successful companies of the time, such as IBM and SperryRand, made their money building computing systems that were
purchased by large institutions and companies and by
programming and servicing those computers to meet the
particular needs of clients. 40 Given the large investment

Sipress, supra note 1.
37 Bobbie Johnson, Cloud Computing is a Trap, Warns GNU Founder
Richard Stallman, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2008, 9:11 AM),
http://www.theguardian.con/technology/2008/sep/29/cloud.computing.rich
ard.stallman.
' Bruce Schneier, Cloud Computing, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (June 4, 2009, 6:14
AM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/06/cloud-computing.html
("[H]ype aside, cloud computing is nothing new. It's the modern version of
the timesharing model of the 1960s, which was eventually killed by the rise
of the personal computer.").
36

39 See ROY A. ALLAN, A HISTORY OF THE PERSONAL COMPUTER: THE

PEOPLE AND TECHNOLOGY, pt. 1, ch. 2.1 (Allan Publ'g 2001).
"o See Christopher LaMorte & John Lilly, Computer: History and
Development,

JONES

TELECOMMS.

&

MULTIMEDIA

ENCYCLOPEDIA,

http://www.dia.eui.upm.es/asignatu/sis-op l/comphd/comphd.htm
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associated with the purchase of early computer systems, such
transactions were usually documented in individually
negotiated (or negotiable) contracts that specified such matters
as required deliverables, applicable deadlines, intellectual
property ownership, and maintenance requirements. 41
Given the high costs associated with purchasing and
maintaining mainframe (and mini-) computers, it did not take
long for the computer experts of the time to realize that there
was excess computing capacity within most computers that
could be used by others, provided that the technological
challenges of transmitting data between computers could be
solved.4 2 Thus, by the late 1960s, a new computer-related
industry was born: the time-sharing industry (aka service
bureaus and data centers), with pioneering companies like
National CSS, Inc. allowing businesses to essentially rent the

(describing five generations of modern computers from 1945 to the end of
the twentieth century) (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); see also Telex Corp. v.
Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 267 (1973) (including factual
findings that describe the "electronic data processing industry" in the late
1960s and early 1970s).
41 See generally RICHARD L. BERNACCHI & GERALD H. LARSEN, DATA
PROCESSING CONTRACTS AND THE LAW (Little, Brown and Co. 1974);
RICHARD RAYSMAN & PETER BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND
NEGOTIATING FORMS AND AGREEMENTS (L. J. Press 1984).
42 See John McCarthy, Reminiscences on the Theory of Tine-Sharing,
PROFESSOR
JOHN
MCCARTHY:
FATHER
OF
At,

http://jnc.stanford.edu/conputing-science/timuesharing.html
(last visited
Oct. 19, 2014) ("By time-sharing, I meant an operating system that permits
each user of a computer to behave as though he were in sole control of a
computer, not necessarily identical with the machine on which the operating
system is running."); see also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 377-78 ("The
service bureau concept was developed to allow users who had no
requirement for a multimillion dollar mainframe computer or even a
microcomputer with all the paraphernalia and skills entailed, to nevertheless
partake, for a price, in their benefits.").
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use of a computer. Like the relationships that existed between
the sellers and purchasers of mainframe computers (and later
minicomputers), the relationships between time-sharing
companies and their customers were usually defined by
negotiated written agreements that included promises of
confidentiality and security. 43 Also, because the data was
transmitted over old-school (albeit dedicated) telephone lines
using modems or off-line in a variety of storage formats (e.g.,
magnetic tape and floppy discs), there were more choke points
along the way that could be used to control the confidentiality
and security of the transmissions.

4

See generally BERNACCHI & LARSEN, supra note 41; RAYSMAN

&

Another industry that grew out of the development of
mainframe computers was the computer data storage industry,
including two types of companies: those that invent and
provide the necessary equipment and technology, like
StorageTek, and those that use the available equipment and
technology to provide storage services to businesses.4 4 Even
before the advent of the cloud (and since), it was recommended
that companies that utilized computers in their business
routinely back-up (or "vault") their important data. In this way,
if the original data was lost or compromised, it could be
restored using the backed-up information. Generally, this could
be done in one of two ways: internally using extra computer
media or server capacity or externally using the services of
various providers.

BROWN, supra note 41.

See Kazou Goda & Masara Kitsuregawa, The History of Storage Systems,
100
PROCS.
OF
THE
IEEE
1433
(2012),
available
at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stanp.jsp?arnunber=6182574.
4
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At the same time that the data processing and storage
industries were developing, efforts were undertaken to develop
computer terminals that could replace the punch card and paper
tape systems of data entry and that would allow mainframe and
mini-computers to be accessed remotely. Early computer
terminals were typically "dumb terminals" in that they only
allowed for data to be entered and seen, with the host computer
providing the processing power and running the software.4 5 As
computer technology developed throughout the 1970s and
1980s, so-called "smart" or "intelligent" terminals were
developed that allowed for some processing at the terminal in
addition to the host computer.4 6 The development of smart
computer terminals, in turn, raised issues about how a user
should interface with whatever computer processing unit they
were using, be it located in their home or at a remote location.
Despite the emergence of the time-sharing and data
storage industries, as early as the 1960s, technology companies
recognized that future growth in the computer industry would
hinge on making hardware accessible to individuals. 47 The era
of personal computing officially began in 1974 when Micro
Instrumentation and Telemetry Systems (MITS) introduced a

See
Dumb
Terminal,
WEBOPEDIA,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/dumub_terminal.html
(last
visited
Nov. 3, 2014).
46 See generally ALLAN, supra note 39, at pt. 2, ch. 4.1 (discussing smart
terminals); see also Ron Rader, Slow to Develop, but ...
Big Screen, 132Column Units Setting Trend, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 26, 1981, at 41, 44
(discussing the evolution of computer terminals).
47 EMERSON W. PUGH, BUILDING IBM: SHAPING AND INDUSTRY AND ITS
TECHNOLOGY 317 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1995).
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computer kit designed for hobbyists.4 8 The personal computing
industry experienced fast growth through the 1980s,
particularly after the development of the IBM personal
computer and the founding of Apple Computer and
Microsoft. 49

As

personal

computer

sales

grew,

new

competitors rushed into the emerging and lucrative market and
a shift from a hardware-focused industry to a software-focused
industry occurred. 5 0 By the late 1990s, it was clear that
Microsoft's software-based business model held more potential
for future growth than the traditional hardware-based model.
As long as there was a need for better and faster
personal computers and more software programs, there was a
recurring market for new and improved computers, terminals,
operating systems, and software. The need for faster and more
dependable personal computers received a boost in the early
1990s due to three important developments: (1) the invention
and ultimate implementation of the first web browser, the
World Wide Web, as first detailed in a memorandum by Tim
Berners Lee in March of 1989, titled "Information
Management: A Proposal"; 5 ' (2) the related development of
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTP), and the Hypertext Markup Language (html);5 2

4 ADAM OSBORNE & JOHN DVORAK, HYPERGROWTH: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE OSBORNE COMPUTER CORPORATION 6 (Idthekkethan Pub. Co.

1984).
49 See id. at 10; PUGH, supra note 47, at 315.
50 See ALLAN, supra note 39, at pt. 2; OSBORNE & DVORAK, supra note 48,

at 11; Schmidt, supra note 15, at 351-53 (describing the "metamorphoses of
a computer program").
51 JAMES GiLLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN: THE

STORY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 180 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
52 Id. at 206.
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and (3) the decision by the Clinton Administration to open up
the Internet to commercial use. 53
Instead of simply using computers for word processing,
accounting, or gaming purposes, individuals and businesses
could use them for a variety of communication purposes. This
not only resulted in greater demand for personal computers and
software, but led to the dot-com boom and bust and the
development of many of the Internet-based business models
and delivery methods that we use today, such as Amazon,
Google, Facebook and eBay. With the resulting increase in the
use of computers by individuals and small businesses, sales of
personal computers and related software naturally increased.
Today, the heady days when consumers and businesses bought
new personal computers and software every two or three years
has disappeared to be replaced by the sale of the next
generation of computing devices, such a smart phones, ereaders, and tablet computers.
B. The Emergence of Cloud Computing
In many respects, cloud computing is a natural
progression for the computer, Internet, and telecommunications

s Id. at 265. This was the brain-child of Vice President Al Gore and why he
deserves some credit for enabling the commercial use of the Internet.
Although he did not invent the technical aspects of the Internet, he did have
the vision to see how a technology that was developed for use by the
military and universities might be of use to business and the general public
and advocated for the commercial use of the "information super-highway."
See SuSAN R. HARRIS & ELISE GERICH, RETIRING THE NSFNET BACKBONE
SERVICE:

CHRONICLING

THE

END

OF

AN

ERA,

http://merit.edu/research/nsfnet-article.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2014)
(detailing the shift from the NSFNET to the commercial Internet today).
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industries. It takes three things that those industries have in
common-server capacity, technical abilities, and customer
service capabilities -and
attempts to package them into
saleable business and personal services that are not dependent
upon the sale of hardware or software. 5 4 IBM described the
circumstances leading to cloud computing and the development
of its "smarter cloud" initiative this way:
Despite enormous advances in computing power, the
world's IT infrastructure-already under severe stress from
today's computing tasks-could easily become overwhelmed
by the onrushing complexity and unprecedented data generated
by nearly a trillion instrumented and interconnected devices,
objects, processes and people.
Fortunately, help is at hand. It comes in the form of a
new model called "cloud computing," in which processing,
storage, networking, and applications are accessed as services
over networks-public, via the Internet; or private, via
intranets. It makes possible a new level of system
intelligence-also known as "services management"-with the
potential to secure, authenticate, customise and just plain keep
up with the coming wave of data complexity and volume.5 5
As the foregoing suggests, cloud computing services
can take many forms.

56

5 It also provides them with the opportunity to collect information and
control its dissemination but that is a subject for another article.
Smarter

Clouds

on

the

Horizon,

IBM,

https://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/global/files/au-enukcloud-vision
s-pdf.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
56 According to the World Privacy Forum, "cloud computing services exist
in many variations, including data storage sites, video sites, tax preparation
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Some of the services being offered in the cloud are
undoubtedly new, but others are simply re-packaged. As
previously noted, the service of storing and processing data on
computers (or at least on computer-readable media) has been in
existence for well over fifty years. 57 Another example of an old
service being re-labeled for the cloud concerns the distribution,
maintenance, and improvement of software over the Internet,
also known as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)." Instead of
customers having to invest in an expensive suite of software,
they can essentially rent the use of needed software, thereby
sharing the costs with other companies with similar needs. 5 9
An added benefit of SaaS is that it is flexible and comes with
technical support. According to the NIST, other cloud-based
service models include Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (laaS), both of which involve a
range of services previously provided before cloud
computing. 60
What is new about cloud computing is: (1) it is
explicitly based upon network connectivity; (2) the potential

sites, personal health record websites, photography websites, [and] social
networking sites." WPF Resource Page: Cloud Computing and Priv'acy,
WORLD

PRIVACY

FORUM,

http://www.worldprivacyforun.org/20t 1/11/resource-page-cloud-privacy
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
57 See supra text accompanying note 39.
5 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2 (defining Software-as-aService).
59 This is similar to the old-school use of mainframe computers where
"dumb terminals" were used to access remote mainframe computers that
had the desired processing capabilities, including computer programming
(aka software) that was not transferred to the end user. See Dumb Terminal,
supra note 45.
60 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2-3 (defining Platform-as-aService and Infrastructure-as-a-Service).
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scale and breath of its use, including the ability of users to
access the cloud with devices that have limited data storage
capabilities (such as smart phones and tablet computers); (3)
the fact that it is touted as an "online" alternative for storing
masses of business documents and personal information; and
(4) the number and diversity of companies that have lined up to
provide such services. In addition to traditional computer
companies like Microsoft, IBM, and Dell, Internet and
telecommunications companies such as Amazon, Google,
Facebook, and Verizon are all involved in the cloud computing
market. Some cloud computing services, like Google Does and
Dropbox, are primarily geared toward individuals and small
businesses or are focused on providing functionality (remote
document retrieval and editing) as much as storage. Other
companies focus on more discrete services like web-hosting or
software-as-a-service. 6 1 Some companies, like Amazon and
IBM, offer a wide-variety of cloud-based services.
In one form or another, cloud computing services store
bits of information on behalf of their customers. 62 Indeed, it is
the promise of decreased hardware needs (in the form of server
capacity) that is at the heart of much of the cloud computing
hype. 63 Normally, a company needs to purchase hardware
resources to create one or more tangible in-house or off-site

DreamHost is an example of a webhosting service while Salesforce is an
example of a software-as-a-service provider.
62 See Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG., (Mar. 13, 2013),
61

available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00. asp.
63

See,

e.g.,

In-House

vs.

Cloud

Servers,

XYFON

SOLUTIONS,

http://xyfon.conVhouse-servers-vs-cloud-servers (comparing in-house and
cloud servers and noting that "[m]ost small to mid-sized companies have
traditionally invested in on-site servers to host their applications, email, and
file sharing") (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
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server farms.6 In so doing, it must not only predict how much
server capacity is needed on average but must also account for
potential spikes in demand for server capacity. With cloud
computing, companies can, in essence, rent hardware and
software resources from others and create a virtual server that
can be scaled up or down as needed. 5 Except when using a
"private cloud" that is owned and operated exclusively by the
consumer, the computer equipment utilized (and thus, the
information stored) does not reside in-house but can consist of
multiple servers located in various locations (possibly
throughout the world).6 6
The actual and potential scale of cloud computing is
important because it also marks another expansion (or shift) in
the nature and wording of contracts that are used for backoffice computer and Internet support services. In the early days
of the computer industry, when the sale of mainframe
computers, specialized programming, and related services were
the focus of the industry, individually negotiated contracts
were the norm.67 As the personal computer, software, and the
Internet markets developed, however, individually negotiated
contracts were replaced by mass-distributed form contracts.6 8

See id. (explaining that "[w]ith [an in-house server], you'll also need to
refresh your hardware, renew software licenses, perform upgrades, and
extend warranties every five to seven years").
65 See id. ("Beyond this, [a cloud server] also provides an easily scalable
solution that can accommodate changing business needs.").
66 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 3 (defining the four types of
"clouds").
67 See BRADSHAW ET AL., supra note 10, at 3 ("Traditional IT outsourcing
arrangements typically involve negotiated contracts for narrowly specified
data storage and processing facilities and services for a set period of time.").
68 See Miles R. Gilburne & Ronald L. Johnston, Trade Secret Protectionfor
64

Softwiare Generally and in the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J., 211, 228
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Given the sheer magnitude of the business being conducted
over the Internet, it was no longer feasible to individually
negotiate all license agreements and form click-wrap and
browse-wrap agreements were used instead. 69 To a lesser
extent, a similar shift has occurred in the cloud where there is
now a mix of take-it-or-leave it terms of service agreements
and form agreements with some negotiation or specialization
allowed. 70 Generally, however, (as with Internet service
providers (ISPs) before them) although cloud storage services
are willing to make a lot of promises about the services they
will provide, at least with respect to the public cloud and low
cost or zero cost services (the so-called "freemium" model),
they are not willing to accept the liability that might flow from
the terabytes of information they agree to handle. 7 1

C. Features of Cloud Storage Terms of Service
Agreements
As the cloud computing industry has evolved and new
products and services are offered, the contracts that are used in
connection with such services have also evolved. When cloud
computing began to come into vogue in 2009, many of the

(1981) (describing the use of shrink-wrap licenses to protect trade secrets
embedded in mass distributed software).
69 See Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 68, at 227 (outlining the history of
the shift to mass-marketed software); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91
MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006) (describing shrink-wrap, browse-wrap, and clickwrap agreements, and the legal issues surrounding them); see also Christina
L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Inplied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 Bus. LAWYER 279 (2003); Sharon K.
Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agreements,
26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499 (2003).
70 See BRADSHAW ET AL., supra note 10, at 15.
71

See discussion infra PartII.C.
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services were offered with take-it-or leave it terms of service
agreements similar to those posted by ISPs. 72 A review of such
contracts in late 2009 revealed that cloud computing services
appeared to be re-purposing form agreements that were
developed in the early days of the Internet when the major
concerns of ISPs were avoidance of liability for service
interruptions and materials posted by others and the ownership
of shared and posted content.7 3 Then, as now, some of these
contracts suffered from legal schizophrenia caused by attempts
to address different legal risks in multiple and seemingly
inconsistent agreements and policies. For instance, while a
cloud service provider might disclaim responsibility for
security in its Terms of Service Agreement, it may promise a
particular level of privacy in its Privacy Policy. 74

72 See BRADSHAW ET AL., supra note 10, at 15; Sandeen, supra note 69, at

503.
This observation is based upon the author's personal examination of
various Terms of Service Agreements as referenced in her 2003 article, The
73

Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use Agreements, and her more

recent review of cloud computing agreements, including Amazon Terms of
Service Agreement, Terramark Terms of Service Agreement, OpSource
Terms of Service Agreement, Rackspace Terms of Service Agreement, and
Google Terms of Service Agreement. See Sandeen, supra note 69, at 499.
74 Compare Amazon Web Services (AWS) Customer Agreement, AMAZON

WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last visited Oct. 20,
2014),

with

AWS

PrivacY

http://aws.amazon.com/privacy
DropBox

Terms

of

Policy,

AMAZON

(last visited Oct.

Service,

DROPBOX

WEB

SERVICES,

20, 2014); compare
(Feb.

20,

2014),

https://www.dropbox.com/terns, with DropBox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX
(Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.dropbox.com/lterms#privacy; compare Google
Terms

of

Service,

supra

note

8,

http://www.google.com/policies/privacy
[hereinafter Google Privacy Policy].
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As of early 2015, the nature and scope of cloud service
contracts have become more varied, but they are often based
upon form contracts and online Terms of Service
Agreements. 7 5 Undoubtedly realizing the need to provide some
measure of security for stored data, particularly for businesses
that are under a legal obligation to comply with various
information security laws, there is a noticeable increase in the
willingness of cloud service providers to promise some level of
security with respect to some of the services they provide.7 6
For instance, many companies now allow their clients to limit

75 See W. Kuan Hon et al., Negotiating Cloud Contracts: Looking at Clouds

from Both Sides Now, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 79, 83-84 (2012) ("The
starting point for cloud contracts is usually the providers' standard terms
and conditions. . . . However, as many providers' standard terms are not

suitable to accommodate enterprise users' requirements, cloud users have
sought changes to make the terms more balanced and appropriate to their
own circumstances. It appears that there has been some movement in this
direction, particularly for large users. Nevertheless, our research indicates
that some providers' negotiations are very process-driven, particularly at the
lower price end of the market, where providers seemed unable or unwilling
to accommodate differences such as corporate structures entailing (for
users) separate localized contracts for non-United States affiliates.").
76

Id.

Compare

Dropbox

Terms

of

Service,

DROPBOX,

http://web.archive.org/web/20120504122034/https://www.dropbox.con/ter
ms (last updated Mar. 26, 2012), with Dropbox Terms of Service, supra note
74. The previous reference to "Account Security" that placed all the burden
of security on its customers is eliminated and in its associated Privacy
Policy, Dropbox states: "Stewardship of your data is critical to us and a
responsibility that we embrace. We believe that our users' data should
receive the same legal protections regardless of whether it's stored on our
services or on their home computer's hard drive." Dropbox Priv'acy Policy,
supra note 74. However, the Dropbox Terms of Service Agreement
continues to include a broad disclaimer of liability for "loss of data." See
Dropbox Terms of Service, supra note 74.
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the geographic regions in which their data will be stored.7 7 The
level of security promised, however, usually depends upon the
needs of the customer and how much they are willing to pay.
Thus, while sophisticated companies with significant resources
may now be able to exact express promises of security from
some cloud service providers, the lower cost (or free) cloud
storage services used by individuals and small businesses often
disclaim or limit their responsibility for security, thereby
placing the burden for security on their customers. 78 Moreover,
for trade secret purposes, the promises of security do not
usually include a promise that stored documents will be kept
confidential.
The Customer Agreement for Amazon Web Services
(AWS) illustrates both the evolution and limitations of the
form terms of service agreements used by some cloud storage
services and the potential risks that they pose to trade secrets
stored in the cloud. In late 2009, Section 7.2 (labeled
"Security") of the AWS Customer Agreement read:
We strive to keep Your Content secure, but cannot
guarantee that we will be successful at doing so, given the
nature of the Internet. Accordingly . . . you acknowledge that
you bear sole responsibility for adequate security, protection
and backup of your Content and Applications. We strongly
encourage you, where available and appropriate, to (a) use
encryption technology to protect Your Content from

77 W. Kuan Hon et al., supra note 75, at 100 ("Some services allow users to

choose locations of data centers used to process users' data, e.g., European
Union-only, while providers are increasingly offering, albeit with
exceptions, to restrict data to users' chosen locations as standard."
(footnotes omitted)).
78 Id. at 92 ("According to our research, providers state [disclaimers of]
liability [are] non-negotiable, and 'everyone else accepts it."').
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unauthorized access (b) routinely archive Your Content, and
(c) keep your Applications or any software that you use or run
with our Services current with the latest security patches or
updates. We will have no liability to you for any unauthorized
access or use, corruption, deletion, destruction or loss of any of
Your Content or Applications. 79
As of late 2013, in the AWS Customer Agreement last
updated on March 15, 2012, the relevant provision read:
4.2 Other Security and Backup. You are responsible for
properly configuring and using the Service Offerings and
taking your own steps to maintain appropriate security,
protection and back-up of Your Content, which may include
the use of encryption technology to protect Your Content from
unauthorized access and routine archiving Your Content.... 80
In other words, although Amazon Web Services would
provide its customers with some security tools, the
implementation of those tools is up to the customer. This
limitation is emphasized in Section 3.1 of the March 15, 2012
AWS Customer Agreement which, while seemingly promising
security and privacy, actually places the burden of security
squarely on the customer. It reads: "Without limiting Section
10 or your obligations under Section 4.2, we will implement
reasonable and appropriate measures designed to help you

7

AWS

Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB

SERVICES,

available at

http://web.archive.org/web/2009083103411 1/http://aws.amazon.con/agree
ment (last updated Aug. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Aug. 26, 2009 AWS
CustomerAgreement].
s AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 74.
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secure Your Content against accidental or unlawful loss, access
or disclosure." 8 1
Provisions, such as the foregoing, 82 that expressly state
that cloud storage providers are not assuming responsibility for
the security of stored data are undoubtedly designed to prevent
a finding of any implied security obligation. To be doubly
certain that no liability will arise for security breaches, other
provisions of both the circa 2009 and the March 15, 2012 AWS
Customer Agreement contain additional limitations. For
instance, in 2009, Section 11.2 of the AWS Customer
Agreement read: "You represent and warrant ...
that you are
solely responsible for the . . . security . . . of Your Content."

.

Similarly, Section 11.5, disclaimed all warranties that "THE
DATA YOU STORE WITHIN THE SERVICE OFFERINGS
WILL BE SECURE OR NOT OTHERWISE LOST OR
DAMAGED," and Section 11.8 stated that Amazon shall not
be liable for any damages resulting from "UNAUTHORIZED
ACCESS TO OR ALTERATION OF YOUR CONTENT."83
In the current agreement, Section 10 states, in part, that AWS
makes "NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES . .
THAT . . . YOUR CONTENT OR THE THIRD-PARTY
CONTENT, WILL BE SECURE OR NOT OTHERWISE
LOST OR DAMAGED."
The terms of service agreement that Google uses
(governing its Google Does service, as well as other services
such as Gmail) has also evolved over time and has been greatly

si Id. (emphasis added).
82 See supra text accompanying note 81.
8 Aug. 26, 2009 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 79 (emphasis in
original).
1 4 AWS CustomerAgreement, supra note 74.
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simplified from previous agreements. What is interesting about
its circa-2013 agreement in comparison with the agreements of
other companies does not relate so much to the promises of
security and confidentiality, or lack thereof, but to the broad
uses that Google can make of stored information. In part, the
agreement reads:
When you upload or otherwise submit content to our
Services, you give Google (and those we work with) a
worldwide license to use, host, store, reproduce, modify, create
derivative works (such as those resulting from translations,
adaptations or other changes we make so that your content
works better with our Services), communicate, publish,
publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such content.
The rights you grant in this license are for the limited purpose
of operating, promoting, and improving our Services, and to
develop new ones. 85
Whether its customers understand this or not, the
foregoing provision, among others, allows Google to use the
information it collects from one of its services (say Gmail) for
many other purposes. Critical to the current analysis is
Google's asserted right "to use," "communicate," "publish,"
and "publicly perform" customer content, albeit for the
"limited purpose" of using it with respect to any Google
service now known or to be developed.
As is further

1 Google Tens of Service, supra note 8.

The reason that cloud storage services may want to obtain a right to
"publicly perform" stored content is made clear by the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decision in American Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc.,
where the Court found that Aereo's system involved a public performance
under the transmit clause. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); see also 17 U.S.C. §101
(2012). Pursuant to this precedent, depending how a cloud storage service is
designed, the storage of copyright protected information in the cloud, even
86
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explained infra, this is not consistent with general notions of
the confidential treatment of documents. 87
While the broad and varied use of information stored in
the various Google services is problematic enough, nowhere in
the foregoing Google Terms of Service is the issue of data
security addressed. Rather, like other agreements of its kind,
the Google Agreement includes a disclaimer of responsibility
for "lost data" and a disclaimer of implied warranties.8 8
Significantly, Google does not promise that such use will be
confidential or private. Indeed, (apparently since getting in
trouble with the Federal Trade Commission for failing to abide
by its own privacy policies) 89 Google now admits that it offers
little or no privacy. In the "Information Security" portion of its
Privacy Policy, Google states:
We work hard to protect Google and our users from
unauthorized access to or unauthorized alteration, disclosure or
destruction of information we hold. In particular:
We encrypt many of our services using SSL.

at the behest of a consumer, may be considered an infringing "public
performance." 17 U.S.C. §106(4).
87 See infra text accompanying notes 153-57.
Google Tens of Service, supra note 8.
8 See FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles Rollout of Its
Buzz Social Network: Google Agrees to Inplenient Comprehensive Privacy
Program to Protect Consumer Data, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Mar. 30, 2011),

http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/20t 1/03/ftc-chargesdeceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its -buzz; see also Google, Inc.,
No.
102
3136
(F.T.C.
2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/20 11/03/110330goog
lebuzzagreeorder.pdf.
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We offer you two step verification when you access
your Google Account, and a Safe Browsing feature in Google
Chrome.
We review our information collection, storage and
processing practices, including physical security measures, to
guard against unauthorized access
to systems.
We restrict access to personal information to Google
employees,
contractors and agents who need to know that
information in order to process it for us, and who are subject to
strict contractual confidentiality obligations and may be
disciplined or terminated if they fail to meet these
obligations. 90
In other words, while Google is willing to represent the
level of security it provides for its system (which it reserves the
right to change at any time), it is not willing to make the
provision of security a binding commitment, promising only to
"restrict access to personal information." Because of this, the
absence of an express promise of confidentiality, and Google's
broad rights to use stored data not amounting to personal
information, the ability to protect stored information as trade
secrets is compromised.
The desire of cloud storage services to avoid liability
for the confidentiality and security of the information that they
store is understandable given the sheer volume of information
they handle. However, serious questions about the value of the
business model being promoted are raised as a result. While, on
one hand, the cloud is promoted as a cost-effective alternative
to acquiring and maintaining internal server capacity, cloud

90

Google Privacv Policy, supra note 74.
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storage services still recommend that companies maintain
back-up copies of the information and data that is stored in the
cloud and that they institute necessary security precautions,
including encryption. Moreover, for reasons that are explained
infra,91 these arrangements may undermine the trade secret
status of information that is stored in the cloud due to
application of the third party doctrine of trade secret law.
III.

THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT OF TRADE
SECRET LAW

Trade secret law, like other areas of law, has evolved
over a long period of time. 92 Today, the predominant source of
trade secret law is the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),
which was first adopted in 1979 and has now been enacted in
substantial part by forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia. 93 According to the UTSA, in order to protect
information as a trade secret, the information must meet three
requirements: 94 (1) it must be secret, i.e., not generally known

91
92

See infra PartIII.
See generally Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret and Why

Courts Conunit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets

Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 495 (2010).
9

See

Trade

Secret

Act,

UNIF.

L.

COMM'N,

available

at

http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%2OAct
(listing jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA) (last visited Oct. 23,
2014). It is often stated that North Carolina has not adopted the UTSA but
has adopted a statute which is very similar and, thus, is often counted as a
UTSA state. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-152-57 (2013). The two states that
have not yet adopted the UTSA are Massachusetts and New York.
94 UTSA § 1(4) (1985); see Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence,
Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2009)

(explaining the reasonable efforts requirement under the RESTATEMENT
(FIRST)
OF TORTS and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION).
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or readily ascertainable; 95 (2) it must derive independent
economic value from not being generally known or readily
ascertainable; 96 and (3) it must be the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to protect its secrecy. 97
While early treatises on trade secret law were slow to
use the term "reasonable efforts," 9 8 from the very earliest trade
secret cases, courts insisted on evidence that the plaintiff (and
putative trade secret owner) engaged in efforts to protect the
information claimed to have been misappropriated. 9 9 As a 1953
treatise on trade secret law explained, because the existence of
a trade secret is "not passed on officially as is a patent or trademark registration," plaintiffs in trade secret cases have "the
burden of proving that their alleged process is in fact a secret
process."100 In effect, the reasonable efforts requirement is a
"formality" of trade secret law and evidence of the putative
trade secret owner's expectation of secrecy. 101 One of the

95 UTSA
96

§ 1(4)(i).

Id.

97 Id. § 1(4)(ii).
98 See HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR BUSINESS COMPETITION,

&

(Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1909); RIDSDALE ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS (Baker,
Voorhis & Co. 1953).
99 See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 404 (W.D.
Mich. 1908) (refusing to grant an injunction to prevent the use of machines
copied from plaintiff because "[t]here is no evidence that any secrecy was
enjoined on any person employed in drafting designs, making patterns of
construction, or assisting in the construction of any of the last-named seven
machines").
100 ELLIS, supra note 98, § 238 (quoting Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Special Term 1944)).
101 The term "formalities" is borrowed from copyright law and generally
refers to various requirements for obtaining and maintaining copyright
protection, including registration and notice. See generally MILGRIM
BENSEN, supra note 21, § 1.06[6]. Although international copyright norms
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principal elements identified as proof of plaintiffs ownership
of protectable trade secrets was "that secrecy has been
maintained either by non-disclosure or disclosure in
confidence." 0 2 As further explained, "[t]he existence of a
confidential disclosure may be proved by showing that
precautions were taken against disclosure to more persons than
necessary, the use of symbols in place of actual names of
materials used, and so on."1 03
In 1939, when the American Law Institute published
Volume IV of the Restatement (First) of Torts to restate the
law governing unfair business practices, the reasonable efforts
requirement was one of six factors identified as relevant to the
determination whether a set of information should be treated as
a trade secret.1 04 As explained in comment b to §757 of the
Restatement (First) of Torts, "a substantial element of secrecy
must exist [in information sought to be protected as a trade
secret], so that, except by the use of improper means, there
would be difficulty in acquiring the information."o105
In 1970, the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL, now known as the Uniform
Law Commission) began drafting a uniform act to govern trade

have eliminated copyright formalities, the term is used herein with respect
to trade secrets to highlight that trade secret protection is not automatic. Id.
Trade secret owners are required to engage in reasonable efforts to maintain
the secrecy of their information. Id.
102

ELLIS, supra note 98,

§

239.

Id. § 248; see also Mycalex Corp. v. Pemco, 64 F. Supp. 420, 425 (D.
Md. 1946) ("It is not sufficient in the law for one to say that this or that
phase of research or experimentation, or this or that factor in production, is
secret. It must in fact bear the indicia of secrecy .... ).
10 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
103

105 Id.
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secrets, ultimately replacing the Restatement (First) of Tort's
amorphous and flexible six-factor test with the three
requirements set forth above. 06 Although the drafting history,
wording, and structure of the UTSA make it clear that the
reasonable efforts requirement is an essential requirement of
the definition of a trade secret, there is a lingering
misunderstanding about the importance of the reasonable
efforts requirement and where it fits in the trade secret analysis.
Some courts and commentators frame it as an issue separate
and apart from the definition of a trade secret.1 07 In two of the
three states that have yet to adopt the UTSA (Massachusetts
and New York), it continues to be a factor to be considered in
determining whether information should be protected.108 The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition places the
reasonable efforts analysis under the misappropriation prong of
a trade secret claim.1 09 Wherever the issue is situated in the
analysis of trade secrecy, the reasonable efforts requirement
plays an important notice and due process function.

106

See Sandeen, supra note 92, at 513.

107 See, e.g., Lemley et. al., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 49 (6th ed. 2012) ("Besides the existence of a trade

secret, plaintiffs must show under the Uniform Act that they have taken
'reasonable measures' to protect the secrecy of their idea."); see also
MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, at § 1.01 (treating reasonable efforts as
an element of the "procedural" aspect of the trade secret definition, and
contrasted with the "substantive" aspects).
1os See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 49 (1998)
(quoting Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 840 (1972));
Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 407 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
109 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
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A. The Notice Function of the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement
Historically, the reasonable efforts requirement was
recognized as serving a number of different functions
depending on the circumstances and equities of a particular
case. As noted above, some courts stated that it provides proof
of ownership or legitimacy and, in effect, substituted for
government registration.11 0 Other courts noted that it provides
evidence that the subject information had sufficient value to be
worthy of court intervention."' With respect to dealings with
third parties (including employees), some courts identified the
notice function that the reasonable effort requirement serves in
both pinpointing the claimed trade secrets and providing a
potential basis for finding a duty of confidentiality." 2
The first two of the historical functions of the
reasonable efforts requirement (proof of ownership and value)
are now reflected in the secrecy and economic value
requirements of the UTSA. When a putative trade secret owner
succeeds in proving that its information is secret and has
independent economic value due to its secrecy, it establishes
that it owns the information and that it is worthy of court
intervention. Based upon this, the modern and now primary
function of the reasonable efforts requirement is to put others

See supra text accompanying note 100.
11 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174,
178 (7th Cir. 1991).
112 See, e.g., Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d
366, 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that reasonable efforts of plaintiff
technology company including contract terms and proprietary notice clearly
establish that defendant employees were aware of trade secret status of
contested software development).
110

Vol. 19

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF

LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 01

2014

Sandeen, Lost vi the Cloud: Infomatron Flon's aiid the Imlplcatlons of
Cloud Compuragfor Trade Secizt Publcato,

43

on notice of the claimed existence of trade secrets.11 3 By
stating the reasonable efforts requirement of the UTSA
separate and apart from the secrecy and independent economic
value requirements, the UTSA is not merely concerned with
whether the acts of a putative trade secret owner result in
information
becoming
generally
known
or readily
ascertainable; it is also concerned with whether another party
should be subject to liability when the putative trade secret
owner fails to act reasonably to protect its own secrets.
The notice function of the reasonable efforts
requirement is particularly important in third party situations
given that, unlike other intellectual property doctrines, trade
secret misappropriation requires proof of knowledge (or reason
to know) of both the existence and misappropriation of trade
secrets." 4 According to the UTSA, there are three acts that can
constitute
misappropriation:
the wrongful acquisition,
disclosure, or use of trade secrets." 5 When a trade secret owner
voluntarily transfers its trade secrets to another, a claim for
wrongful acquisition is impossible because the information was
voluntarily provided to the other. Thus, unless a contractual
restriction exists to limit how the information can be accessed,
the only way to prove trade secret misappropriation in most
cases involving the voluntary sharing of information is to
establish wrongful disclosure or use in violation of an express
or implied duty of confidentiality. To establish such a claim, it
is axiomatic that a third party must know or have reason to
know that it possesses trade secrets that need to be protected.

113 See Sandeen, supra note 92, at 526.
" UTSA § 1(2) (1985) (definition of "misappropriation").
115 Id.
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While the reasonable efforts requirement serves a
notice function, providing notice of the existence of trade
secrets is not its only function. It also serves to limit the scope
of protectable information and, in this way, operates as a policy
lever that prevents the under-protection of trade secret assets
and over-assertion of trade secret rights." 6 As noted by
Professors Robert Merges and John Duffy in their article about
the history and background of Graham v. John Deere, the
extent to which limitations on IP rights are needed depends in
large part on the scope of exclusive rights that are granted.117
The greater the exclusive rights, the harder it should be to
acquire rights in the first place. This explains the stringent
novelty and non-obviousness requirements of patent law and
the relatively lax requirements of copyright law. Because
patent protection precludes even independent invention, and
therefore provides very strong rights, it makes sense to require
a high hurdle of inventiveness. In contrast, because copyright
law does not preclude independent creation and recognizes
other "fair uses" of copyrightable material, the requirements
for protection are fairly low. Trade secrets are more like
copyrights in that they do not preclude independent creation or
reverse engineering. Moreover, in order to avoid a conflict
between federal patent law and state trade secret law, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of both the
requirements and limitations of trade secret law." 8

116 See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 42-47 (2007).
117 John F. Duffy & Robert P. Merges, The Story of Graham v. John Deere

Company: Patent Law's Evolving Standard of Creativity, in INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY STORIES, 109, 111-114 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2005).
" See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
See also Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits of Trade Secret Law Inposed by
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B. What Constitutes Reasonable Efforts?
While the public policy of the United States and the
UTSA make it clear that the reasonable efforts requirement is
an essential part of the definition of a trade secret, what
constitutes reasonable efforts in any given situation is not
always clear.11 9 Moreover, there are both legal and practical
dimensions to the requirement. Legally, in most jurisdictions,
information will not qualify for trade secret protection unless
some efforts to maintain secrecy are proven.1 20 However, as a
practical matter, greater security measures are often needed to
prevent the loss of trade secrecy.
If one views the reasonable efforts requirement as a
continuum, with one end of the continuum being no efforts and
the other end being extreme efforts, what is required to satisfy
the requirement falls somewhere between the two ends. But
neither the UTSA nor case law signals whether the line should
be drawn closer to the no efforts or extreme measures side of
the continuum; they only say that the line should be determined

Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1462

(1967) (noting that "inevitable leaks, accidental disclosures, and efficient
reverse engineering limit the effectiveness of any program of secrecy" and
therefore limit potential conflicts between patent and trade secret law).
119 See Rowe, supra note 94, at 8-9 (noting that the various sources of law
on the reasonable efforts requirement do not provide guiding standards for
determining what is reasonable); see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau,
Trade Secrets-The New Risks to Trade Secrets Posed by Conputerization,
28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 239-41 (2002) (listing relevant

factors).
120 See, e.g., In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litig., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1377
(2003) ("Because simple measures, such as identifying materials as trade
secrets and using a written confidentiality agreement, are available to
protect sensitive information, the Uniform Act will not imply a confidential
relationship between the parties."); see also Rowe, supra note 94, at 1-2.
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"based upon the circumstances."' 2 1 Since compliance with the
reasonable efforts requirement is an issue of fact, where the
line is drawn depends upon where the trier of fact thinks it
should be drawn.' 2 2 In this way, the reasonable efforts
requirement is the most flexible of the three requirements of
trade secrecy and the factor most apt to be influenced by
equitable considerations.1 23
The flexible and subjective nature of the reasonable
efforts requirement is likely to be a great comfort to
information owners who do little to protect their information,
because it provides some hope of bringing a successful trade
secret claim despite deficiencies in protection efforts. 2 4 Case
law is replete with examples (particularly before the
widespread adoption of the UTSA) of information owners who
used the seeming unfairness of the acquisition or use of their
information to override deficiencies in their ability to prove the
existence of trade secrets.12 5 However, the flexibility of the

121 UTSA § 1(2) (1985) (definition of "trade secret).
122 See SmithKline Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck & Co., Inc., 766 A.2d

442, 448 (Del.
2000) (noting that whether Merck took reasonable
precautions to protect its trade secrets is a question of fact).
123 Rowe, supra note 28, at 30 ("In particular, the most critical part of that
inquiry should be whether the trade secret owner took reasonable steps to
preserve the secrecy of the information.").
124 See P.J. Whelan, Trade Secrets-Problemsof Acquisition, 18 Bus. LAW.

539, 543 (commenting on the uncertain application of trade secret law
before enactment of the UTSA: "[I]t would be unwise to brush aside the
claims of a discloser no matter how preposterous they might be, because, if
he could get his case into the right jurisdiction, he could likely find
precedent which would lend some merit to his position").
125 See Doerfer, supra note 118, at 1432 ("[I]n attempting to eradicate what
is considered to be unconscionable conduct, there is a serious danger that
courts may elevate principles of gentlemanly conduct to the status of legal
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reasonable efforts requirement makes it difficult for business
people who wish to protect their trade secrets to know what
efforts they should engage in to ensure a finding of trade
secrecy. A company that is careful to engage in efforts that it
thinks are reasonable to protect its secrets may find that such
efforts are considered insufficient in a court of law.1 2 6
As a practical matter, the smart business will always do
something to identify and protect its trade secrets so that it can
later argue that its protection efforts were reasonable. However,
since trade secrets are lost once they become "generally known
or readily ascertainable,"1 27 it is important for businesses that
own extremely valuable trade secrets to also engage in more
intensive efforts. Businesses that utilize computers and the
Internet have to be particularly concerned about the ease with
which information can now be reproduced and shared. 28
Without recognized standards to guide the way,
currently, the best way to predict what efforts are needed to
meet the reasonable efforts requirement is to identify the
factors that previous courts have considered and to act in a
manner that is designed to ensure actual secrecy. It has also
been suggested that the nature and size of the putative trade

norms without considering the countervailing interests in rigorous
competition .... ).
126 See Rowe, supra note 94, at 1-2 (noting the second-guessing nature
of
the reasonable efforts requirement).
127 See UTSA § 1(2) (1985) (definition of "trade secret").
121 See Rowe, supra note 94, at 14-26 (describing the threats to trade secrets
posed by "the digital world"); see also Anita Ramasastry et al., Will Wi-Fi
Make Your Private Network Public? Wardriving, Criminal and Civil
&

Liability, and Security Risks of Wireless Networks, I SHIDLER J.L. COM.

TECH. 9 (2005).
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secret owner's business should be part of the reasonableness
analysis. 129

IV.

THE
LAW:

THIRD

PARTY

REASONABLE

DOCTRINE
EFFORTS

OF
AS

TRADE SECRET
APPLIED

TO

INFORMATION FLOWS TO THIRD PARTIES

While there is some debate among courts whether a
putative trade secret owner can do little or nothing intraenterprise and still establish the existence of trade secrets for
purposes of a misappropriation claim,1 30 there is no debate that
the decision of a putative trade secret owner to share
information outside the confines of its own business requires it
to tread carefully.131 Generally, when a trade secret owner

129

See Rowe, supra note 94, at 29-30: see also Jermaine S. Grubbs,

Comment, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at Trade Secret
Protection: Why the "Reasonable Efforts" Taken by Small Businesses

Should be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 421, 426
(2005).
130 Compare Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d
892, 903-04 (Minn. 1983), with Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasonable efforts treated as part
of the analysis but as a minor factor in cases where evidence of
misappropriation by improper means exists). The differing approaches may
be explained by a lack of appreciation for the fact that the UTSA was
intended to ensure that courts would not find misappropriation without first
finding the existence of a trade secret. The differing approaches may be
explained by a lack of appreciation for the fact that the UTSA was intended
to ensure that courts would not find misappropriation without first finding
the existence of a trade secret. See Sandeen, supra note 92, at 496 (detailing
the drafting history of the UTSA).
131 See MiLGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, § 3.03 ("[T]here can be no
protection of a trade secret if disclosure of it is made in the absence of a
confidential relationship, a contract or if disclosure is made in a way that
does not meet explicit requirements of the parties' contract."); see also
Silicon Image, Inc. v. Analogk Semiconductor, Inc., No. C-07-00635JCS,
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voluntarily shares information with another, it risks waiving
whatever trade secrecy may exist in such information even in
situations where the information does not become generally
known of readily ascertainable.1 32 As summarized in an early
article on trade secret law: "In by far the largest proportion of
decided cases in which the courts have afforded protection to a
trade secret or secrets the defendant is the one to whom the
successful plaintiff had directly imparted the secret which is
the subject of litigation."1 33 This occurs, for instance: (1) when
trade secret information is disclosed to employees; (2) when
the owner of the trade secret is seeking to sell an idea or
unpatented invention; and (3) when the owner of the trade
secret discloses it for "other special purposes. However,
pursuant to the doctrine of relative secrecy, trade secret owners
can share their secrets with third parties without losing trade
secret protection if the disclosures are limited and the persons

2008 WL 166950, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008) ("[C]ourts have denied
trade secret protection where allegedly confidential information has been
revealed to third-parties without protections that are considered adequate.").
132 See Flotec, Inc. v. Southern Res., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1005-07 (S.D. Ind.
1998) ("Even if any of the information that Flotec disclosed to SRI
qualified as a trade secret, the weight of the evidence presented here shows
that Flotec's disclosure of that information to SRI was outside the scope of
any confidential relationship, so that Flotec's disclosure destroyed the
secrecy of all the information."); see also Taylor v. Babbitt, 760 F. Supp. 2d
80, 86 (D.D.C. 2011). As explained by James Pooley: "[T]he examination
of secrecy as an element of the definition involves a dual path. One must of
course be concerned with the extent to which the secret is known, or could
be known with but a modicum of effort. . . . But one must also address the
question of what the owner has done by way of self-help efforts to keep the
secret held within its intended bounds." James Pooley, TRADE SECRETS §
4.04 (L.J. Press 2007).
133 Mathias F. Correa, Protection of Trade Secrets, 18 Bus. LAW. 531, 532
(1963).
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to whom such disclosures are made are under an express or
implied duty of confidentiality.1 34
As explained by the court in Hun iphers v. First
Interstate Bank of Oregon, a breach of confidentiality case:
"The contours of [an] asserted duty of confidentiality are
determined by a legal source external to the tort claim itself. A
plaintiff asserting a breach of a nonconsensual duty must
identify its source and terms."1 35 As applied to trade secret
cases, this means that a duty of confidentiality does not arise
from the mere fact that the defendant possesses trade secrets
but must be found in some other source of law. As the case law
has developed, the circumstances that give rise to the requisite
duty of confidentiality often fall into one of four categories: (1)
an express agreement; (2) an agreement implied-in-fact; (3) an
agreement implied-at-law (a "quasi-contract"); and (4) duties
imposed by law either as specified in a statute (e.g., the
attorney-client privilege) or based upon common law principles
applicable to trust and fiduciary relationships.1 36
Because most trade secret disputes arise in the context
of an employment relationship, courts are often quick to find
that employees owe an implied duty of loyalty or

See Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F. 2d 174,
177 (7th Cir. 1991).
135 Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 298 Or. 706, 718-19 (1985).
134

136 See MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21,

§

7.01; RESTATEMENT (FIRST)

OF TORTS § 757 cmt. on clause (b) (1939); Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving
Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763 (2014) (detailing the law of
implied confidentiality and advocating for its application to better protect
the privacy interests of Internet users); Herbert David Klein, The Technical
Trade Secret Quadrangle:A Sur'eY, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 437 (1960).
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confidentiality to their employers. 137 Even in these cases,
however, there is always an issue whether the defendant/former
employee had adequate notice of the existence and identity of
the claimed trade secrets.1 3 8 The more difficult cases involve
the voluntary disclosure of information to non-employee third
parties. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "[i]f an
individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no
obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or
otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his property right is
extinguished."1 39 The reason these cases are tough is because
there is no settled definition of confidential relationships, and
equitable considerations often play a big part in decisions that
recognize an implied duty of confidentiality. 140
Ideally, in all cases involving the disclosure of trade
secrets to a third party, the trade secret owner will obtain an
express confidentiality agreement from the third party before

137 See, e.g., L.M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435 (N.Y.
Special Term 1948) ("It is implied in every contract of employment that the
employee will hold sacred any trade secrets or other confidential
information which he acquires in the course of employment.").
13s See, e.g., Furr's Inc. v. United Specialty Adver., Co., 385 S.W.2d. 456,
459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) ("Confidential relationship is a two way street: If
the disclosure is made in confidence, the 'disclosee' should be aware of it.
He must know that the secret is being revealed to him on the condition he is

under a duty to so keep it."); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§

757 cmt. m ("The actor is subject to liability under the rule stated in this
Clause only if he has notice of both the fact that the information is secret
and the fact that the disclosure by the third person is a breach of his duty.").
139 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984).
140 "Although the reported cases cover a multitude of situations
where
protected disclosure of trade secrets is recognized, these cases do not
delineate the type of relationship under which such disclosures may occur."
MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21,
Vol. 19
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any disclosures occur.' 4 ' In such cases, the source of the duty
of confidentiality is a contract that can then be used as the basis
for both a breach of contract claim and a trade secret
misappropriation claim. In the absence of an express
agreement, the trade secret owner may rely on contract
principles to establish an implied-in-fact duty of confidentiality
or argue that a statute or other independent body of law (such
as the law of trusts) 4 2 imposes such a duty. Absent these
sources of a duty of confidentiality, the trade secret owner's
only recourse is to make the equitable argument that an
implied-at-law duty of confidence exists by virtue of the nature
of the relationship between the trade secret owner and the party
to whom trade secrets are given and the circumstances
surrounding the sharing of trade secret information. 1 43This

141 The language of the express confidentiality agreement must also
specify
required protections that are adequate in nature and duration. See Silicon
Image, Inc. v. Analogk Semiconductor, Inc., No. C-07-00635JCS, 2008 WL
166950, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008).
142 "The concept of a confidential relationship is commonly employed
in at
least two branches of law: trusts and agency. Nonetheless, courts rendering
trusts or agency opinions tend to characterize a relationship as being a
'fiduciary' one, or one of confidence without giving reasons for such
conclusory positions." MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, § 3.03
(footnotes omitted).
143 See Hartzog, supra note 136, at 763 (detailing the factors that are often
considered in implied confidentiality cases). Before the adoption of the
UTSA, courts (principally acting in equity) often founded successful trade
secret claims upon a finding of a breach of confidence rather than an
implied contractual duty of confidentiality. See, e.g., Sun Dial Corp. v.
Rideout, 108 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1954). With the adoption of Section 7 of the
UTSA, which precludes all common law theories of recovery not based in
contract or consistent with the requirements of the UTSA, arguably an
action for breach of confidence is no longer viable. See John T. Cross,

UTSA Displacement of Other State Law Claims, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 445,

467-69 (2011).
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requires a highly fact-specific inquiry that is by no means
certain to result in a finding of the requisite duty.
In the absence of a clear definition of confidential
relationships under the law, the best one can do in trade secret
cases is to try to glean some general rules from previous cases
and argue the equities of the situation in the hope that an
obligation of confidentiality will be found "as a matter of
law." 4 4 Often, a key feature of relationships that give rise to a
duty of confidentiality in the trade secret context is that they
involve the pursuit of a common business purpose where it is
necessary for the trade secret owner to disclose all or a portion
of its trade secrets in order to conduct its business.14 For this
reason, not every seemingly "close" relationship includes an
implied duty of confidentiality.14 6 Moreover, as noted in the
Restatement (First) of Torts, "in all these cases A cannot
impose a confidence on B without B's consent. . . . Likewise,
the confidence does not arise if B has no notice of the
confidential character of the disclosure."1 4 7
Based upon the foregoing, the mere disclosure (or
transfer) of trade secrets to a third party does not create a
confidential relationship; rather, the disclosure must at least be
made under circumstances where the recipient of the
information: (1) knows that it is receiving trade secret

144 See Hartzog, supra note 136, at 763 (listing eleven relevant issues and
practice tips for creating a confidential relationship).
145 See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
146 Com1pare Smith, supra note 145, with Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,
833 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1987), and Town & Country House & Homes
Service, Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314 (1963) (short summaries of the cases
omitted so that the reader knows what is to be drawn from each case)
147 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757, cmt. on clause (b); see also
MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, § 7.01.
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information; and (2) understands and agrees to handle such
information confidentially. 4 8
When parties are dealing at arm's length, as they were
when the drawing was sent to Coatings, the disclosure of the
secret does not, by that fact alone, impose a confidential
relationship. Where what is thought to be a trade secret is
disclosed, the question posed is whether, under the
circumstances, the recipient of the information knew or should
have known that the information is a trade secret and that the
disclosure was made in confidence.1 49
In the context of the cloud, as in other contexts, the
necessary inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis.
To date, no case decision has held that the relationship
between a trade secret owner and a cloud storage service is in
the nature of a trust or fiduciary relationship or that the
relationship otherwise gives rise to a duty of confidentiality.
This is consistent with the traditional definition of a fiduciary
relationship 5 0 and with the law governing bailments, which

14' The analysis is further complicated when information is shared with

multiple third parties or if the person to whom trade secret information is
disclosed is allowed to disclose the information to yet another person or
entity.
149 RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc. 267 N.W.2d 226, 232 (Wis. 1978); see also
Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1237 (5th Cir. 1978).
150 The application of fiduciary duty principles is often unclear and
confused. See John F. Mariani et al., Understanding Fiduciary Duty, 84
MAR FLA. B.J. 20 (2010); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of

Fiduciary Duty:

On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty

and Their

Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002). But

generally, a fiduciary relationship requires something more than a
relationship of trust and confidence (which obviously exists in most
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imposes only limited duties upon bailees and which has
consistently recognized that the bailor/bailee relationship is not
a confidential or fiduciary relationship. 15 It is also consistent
with the desire of cloud storage services to avoid assuming
such responsibilities, as described supra.152
While some cloud storage services may be willing to
provide an express promise of confidentiality, they often
disclaim any responsibility or liability for the security of stored
information.1 53 This not only undermines the creation of an
express promise of security, but also hampers the ability of the
trade secret owner to prove an implied-in-fact promise since a
well-established rule of contract law provides that implied
obligations cannot be inferred where express obligations of the
same nature
are disclaimed. 15 4 Further,
unlike
other
relationships where an implied-at-law duty of confidentiality
has been found, the disclosure or use of trade secrets is not
necessary to further a business relationship between a cloud
storage service and its customers. Thus, although it is
conceivable that a cloud storage service might be held to an
implied-at-law duty of confidentiality under a special set of
facts (even when it has expressly disclaimed liability for stored

contractual situations); it also requires that the alleged fiduciary act on
behalf of another under circumstances that create a potential for abuse.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary as: "A person who is required to
act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of their
relationship ..... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (Deluxe 9th ed. 2009).

§ 1 (2014).
152 See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.
151 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments
1

Id.

1
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 17 (2014) ("As a general rule, if an
express contract between the parties is established, a contract embracing the
same subject cannot be implied; an implied agreement cannot coexist with
the express contract.").
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data),155 the chances are high that no such duty will be found.
This is particularly so since the information that is being stored
in the cloud is not likely to be stored in a manner that gives the
cloud storage service notice of the existence of trade secrets.15 6
Without the existence of either an express or implied
confidential relationship with its cloud storage service, a
company that pursues trade secret misappropriation claims for
information that is (or has been) stored in the cloud is likely to
confront defense arguments that such information is no longer
(or never has been) entitled to trade secret protection due to the
fact that it was stored in the cloud. In this regard, the defendant
will argue that it was not reasonable to store information in the
cloud without first securing an express promise of
confidentiality. In response, the trade secret owner may
produce evidence of the efforts it engaged in to protect its trade
secrets intra-enterprise, but such efforts are likely to be
insufficient if the same information was shared with one or

155 See, e.g., Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985)
(involving a rare case where an implied-at-law duty of confidentiality was
found despite the information recipient's efforts to disclaim any relationship
between the parties).
156 Unless a company that is using the cloud has instituted procedures to
identify and mark documents as "confidential" or "secret," it is unlikely that
even persons under a duty of confidentiality (including those with official
access to a company's piece of the cloud) would know of the existence of
trade secrets. This is particularly true with respect to information that is
being created and modified in the cloud, as opposed to pre-existing
information that is simply being stored in the cloud. Since cloud storage
services such as Google and Dropbox are touting the cloud as a place for
collaboration, it is possible that new ideas will be generated in the cloud
that amount to valuable trade secrets, but no one is charged with
differentiating such information from the multitude of other, perhaps
mundane, information that a company may store in the cloud on a day-today basis.
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more third parties who were not under a duty of confidentiality.
This is because no amount of intra-enterprise reasonable efforts
is sufficient to prevent the loss of trade secrecy that results
from a voluntary, non-confidential disclosure of trade secrets to
third parties and it will be difficult to establish that extracontractual duties of confidentiality exists. 157
Some courts may be troubled by the foregoing analysis
and may seek to liberalize traditional notions of confidential
relationships in order to avoid the forfeiture of trade secret
rights for information stored in the cloud. 5 8 Or they may
interpret the Stored Communications Act or similar laws to

As noted previously, certain information holders (such as attorneys) may
be under a legal duty of confidentiality with respect to some information
that they hold whether or not a contractual duty of confidentiality exists. See
supra text accompanying notes 141-49. Whether cloud storage services are
under a legal duty of confidentiality, particularly where they expressly
disclaim such duty in their Terms of Service Agreements, depends upon
application of the Stored Communications Act and similar state laws. For
reasons that are explained more fully infra, it is doubtful that the Stored
Communications Act imposes a legal duty on cloud storage services due to
the interactive nature of such services. See infra text accompanying notes
261-269; see also William Jeremy Robinson, Free at What Cost? Cloud
157

Computing Privacy Under the Stored Connunications Act, 98 GEO. L.J.

1195, 1195-96 (2010).
15s The early days of the Internet were marked by such efforts in the form of
arguments that were designed either to "save" the Internet from the
application of well-established legal principles that were perceived to
threaten the development and use of new technologies and methods of
doing business, see, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996) (applying an expansive definition of mutual assent to shrink-wrap
licenses), or to expand well-established legal principles to cover new
perceived wrongs. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003)
(refusing to extend the tort of trespass to chattels to cover "otherwise
harmless electronic communications," even though some other courts had
done so).
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impose a legal duty of confidentiality despite disclaimers to the
contrary.1 59 While these approaches might solve the problem of
trade secrets stored in the cloud, however, an expansion of the
definition of confidential relationships to cover relationships in
the cloud could have deleterious effects with respect to other
information flows, such as the law governing the unsolicited
submission of ideas by so-called "idea-men." In other words,
making it easier for information owners to establish
confidential relationships to protect information stored in the
cloud might make it easier for the holders of ideas to assert
similar confidential relationships and successfully assert idea
submission claims, something that the business community
would generally abhor. Rather than making it easier for duties
of confidentiality to be formed in the cloud, more attention
should be paid to the proper definition of "disclosure" under
trade secret law and a better taxonomy should be developed to
differentiate between trade secret destroying "disclosures" and
non-trade secret destroying "mere transfers."

V.

POSSIBLE REFINEMENTS AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE
THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE OF TRADE SECRET LAW

Given the potential harsh effects of the third party
doctrine of trade secret law with respect to trade secrets stored
in the cloud, the practical techniques and legal arguments that
might be used to ameliorate or eliminate those effects are
considered next, followed by a specific proposal for
distinguishing between "disclosures" and "mere transfers."

159 See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447; Intel, 71 P.3d at 296.
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A. Segregate Trade Secret Information or Obtain
an Express Agreement of Confidentiality
One simple and direct approach to avoid the harsh
effects of the third party doctrine of trade secret law is for
companies to ensure that any trade secret information is
excluded from the body of information that is stored in the
cloud. Or they can make the effort and take the time to obtain
an express confidentiality agreement from their cloud storage
services, if possible. The first strategy is the best course of
action because, if followed, the trade secret owner would only
have to worry about its own reasonable intra-enterprise efforts
to maintain secrecy. With the second strategy, the trade secret
owner needs to ensure that reasonable efforts are employed at
both its own facilities and those of the cloud storage service.
B. Limit the Scope and Application of the Third
Party Doctrine of Trade Secret Law
Admittedly, there are unresolved questions concerning
the scope of the third party doctrine of trade secret law (as
there are with the scope of the Fourth Amendment's third party
doctrine, discussed infra). 160 This appears to be due to three
factors. First, the meaning of disclosure under trade secret law
is underexplored and under-theorized. This is important
because the third party doctrine of trade secret law assumes a
degree of revelation of trade secret information between the
trade secret owner and the third party, but the extent of the
revelation needed to trigger a waiver is not clearly defined or
well understood. Second, because trade secret misappropriation
cases often involve bad acts, including potential criminal

160

See infra text accompanying notes 206-214.
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activity, there is a tendency among triers of fact to find trade
secrets where none exist under a strict application of trade
secret principles in order to be able to punish the alleged
wrongdoer.' 6 1 This could happen, for instance, where a court
focuses on the efforts of a trade secret owner to protect its trade
secret intra-enterprise and finds them "reasonable" while
ignoring facts that show the information was otherwise
distributed to third parties with little or no protection efforts.
Finally, disagreements about the proper scope of the third party
doctrine often reflect a lack of understanding concerning the
evolution of trade secret law and why some of its requirements
have become more stringent and less flexible. 6 2 In this regard,
reliance on cases that predate the adoption of the UTSA to
define the scope of the third party doctrine is problematic given
the critical importance of the notice function of the reasonable
efforts requirement under modern trade secret law.1 63
The critical issue concerning the scope of the third
party doctrine of trade secret law centers around the question of
whether the sharing of information with a third party must

161 The author is not advocating that wrongdoers should be able to avoid
responsibility for their wrongs but that such wrongs do not always amount
to trade secret misappropriation. Other theories of tort liability and criminal
wrongdoing exist (or could be created) to address specific wrongful acts
without having to pretend that trade secrets exist when they do not. See
Sharon K. Sandeen The Third Party Problem: Assessing the Protection of
Information Through Tort Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
OF FACT-BASED WORKS: COPYRIGHTS AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 278 (Robert

F.
Brauneis
ed.,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1680546.
162 See Sandeen, supra note 92, at 500.
163 See supra Part III.A.; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S.
986, 1002 (1984) ("Because of the intangible nature of a trade secret, the
extent of the property right therein is defined by the extent to which the
owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others.").
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result in the information becoming generally known or readily
ascertainable for trade secrecy to be lost, or whether trade
secrecy is lost when information is shared with another who is
not under a duty of confidentiality. In their treatise on trade
secret law, Roger Milgrim and Eric Bensen suggest possible
limitations to the third party doctrine of trade secret law so that
a trade secret owner's voluntary, non-accidental third party
disclosures are not considered unreasonable efforts unless they
result in the information becoming generally known. 64
Consistent with this limited view of waiver, they identify three
principal ways that a trade secret owner can destroy its own
trade secrets: (1) disclose the secrets to the world through
publication, for instance, in a published patent application or
trade journal or by posting the trade secrets on the Internet; (2)
disclose the trade secrets in a marketed product or service that
can be reverse engineered; or (3) disclose the trade secrets to
another without an adequate promise of confidentiality. 6 5
Quoting the pre-UTSA and very early case of Tabor v.
Hoffman, Milgrim and Bensen opine that "[t]he issue is
whether the sale or other act in fact discloses the trade
secret."

66

There are at least three problems with the last
statement. First, in order to apply the suggested rule correctly,
the meaning of disclosure must be understood. Although it may
seem obvious to the layperson what is meant by "disclosure,"
just as there are different definitions of the public domain
under different areas of law,1 67 various areas of law (including

MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, § 1.05[3].
Id. § 1.05[1]-[3].
66
1 Id. § 1.05[3] (citing Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30 (1889)).
167 See Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats
and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148-49 (2003).

16 See
65

1
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trade secret law) apply varying definitions of "disclosure"
depending upon the circumstances of a particular case. In fact,
the two concepts are interrelated; generally, the "public
domain" refers to the body of information that is unprotected
by a given area of law while "disclosures" refer to the various
acts that can waive applicable protection. Judging from the
cases that have considered the question of what constitutes
disclosure in various contexts, there are public policy and
equitable reasons why disclosure may be defined more or less
broadly depending upon the underlying purposes of the
applicable law and who initiated the disclosure.' 6 8 Moreover,
as is discussed infra, the real issue suggested by Tabor is
whether the alleged disclosure (in that case the public sale of a
good) actually revealed anything.1 69
Second, the rule suggested by Tabor can be applied
broadly to essentially do away with the reasonable efforts
requirement altogether. In this regard, the varying definitions
of disclosure that are discussed infra usually apply the broadest
definition of disclosure to the voluntary acts of an information
owner in sharing information with another.1 70 This makes
sense since information owners are in the best position to
control the dissemination of their own information. Thus, if the
test of waiver of trade secrecy for owner-initiated actions is
whether the information becomes generally known or readily
ascertainable, why not apply the same test to "lesser" forms of
disclosure? In other words, why not dispense with the

As Judge Rich explained, "the term 'public domain' as a 'questionbegging concept,' and application of the concept to the facts at hand
requires recourse to 'all sorts of legal concepts."' Mine Safety Appliances
Co. v. Electric Storage Battery, Co. 405 F.2d 901, 902 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
169 See infra text accompanying notes 171-172.
170 See infra Table
1.
168
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reasonable efforts requirement and make the test of trade
secrecy depend solely on whether the information is generally
known and readily ascertainable and has economic value?
Based upon the drafting history and language of the
UTSA, the obvious response to the foregoing questions is that
the reasonable efforts requirement is one of three statutory
requirements of trade secrecy and should not be ignored by
courts.171 But the question highlights the third problem with the

statement from Tabor, namely, that application of the principle
would undermine the notice and due process functions of the
reasonable efforts requirement; in effect, it would allow
information owners to protect information without giving
actual or constructive notice of the existence of trade secrets
and an expectation of confidentiality. While a defendant in a
trade secret misappropriation case involving such information
could always argue that it did not have the requisite
"knowledge or a reason to know" of the existence of trade
secrets and the need to maintain them in confidence, it would
be easier to prevail on a motion for summary judgment if a
bright-line test of waiver is applied. Additionally, doing away
with the reasonable efforts requirement altogether may lead to
the under-protection and over-assertion of trade secret rights.1 72

171 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("The remedial significance of such efforts lies in the fact that if
the plaintiff has allowed his trade secret to fall into the public domain, he
would enjoy a windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because the
defendant took the secret from him, rather than from the public domain as it
could have done with impunity." (internal citations omitted)).
172 See Risch, supra note 116, at 45.
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C. Narrow the Meaning of "Disclosure" Under
Existing Trade Secret Law
Arguments that the storage of information in the cloud
should not necessarily or automatically destroy the trade
secrecy status of stored information are often based upon
assumptions that the stored information is not actually
"disclosed" to cloud storage services. Unfortunately, the
definition of disclosure under trade secret law is undertheorized and not well understood. While on the surface the
issue seems to involve a simple factual question, as the
definitions of "disclosure" under trade secret law and other
areas of law reveal, the applicable definition of disclosure often
involves important policy questions. Thus, the measure of
"disclosure" is not just a de facto test; it is a de jure test.
Because the various definitions of disclosure under the law
reflect important policy choices, any effort to modify those
meanings should consider the underlying policies. As
categorized below, the definitions differ not only because of
the policies underlying the applicable law but based upon the
actor and the circumstances surrounding the purported
disclosure.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the
issue of disclosure arises in trade secret cases in two different
ways. First, "disclosure" is one of three potentially wrongful
acts that may subject an individual or company to liability for
trade secret misappropriation, the other two being acquisition
and use.1 73 Second, as discussed infra, the act of disclosure can
also be a trade secret destroying (or disqualifying) act, whether
engaged in by a misappropriator, the owner of the trade secrets,

173 UTSA
Vol. 19

§ 1(4) (1985).
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or a third party.1 74 Unfortunately, courts and litigants do not
always differentiate between the different actors when
discussing the applicable meaning of disclosure and, in fact,
there is little discussion of a definition of disclosure. For
reasons that are explained infra, in some cases, the underlying
purposes of trade secret law demand a narrow definition of
disclosure (for instance, when a misappropriator shares the
trade secrets with only a few people), while in other situations,
a broader definition is warranted.1 75
Where the wrongful acquisition of trade secrets is
suspected, a trade secret owner should act quickly and fight
hard to prevent any actual disclosure by obtaining appropriate
injunctive relief because failure to do so may result in the loss
of trade secrecy due to the dissemination of the information. If
dissemination of information by a misappropriator does occur
("Type I disclosure"), it is appropriate for the trade secret
owner to assert a narrow definition of disclosure in order to
limit the loss of trade secrets. Courts are often reluctant to hold
that the acts of misappropriators, even if resulting in the
dissemination of trade secret information to some third parties,
constitute trade secrecy destroying disclosures unless the trade
secrets become generally known.1 76 From a policy point of
view, this narrow view of disclosure makes sense because it
provides a small window of time in which a trade secret owner
can attempt to protect its rights. 177 Moreover, the limited

174

See supra text accompanying notes 176-193.

175
176

Id.

See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs.,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
177 See Rowe, supra note 28, at 14-15 (discussing cases of trade secrets that
end up in the hands of third parties who are not the original
misappropriators and proposing an analytical framework for preserving
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definition of disclosure applicable to the acts of
misappropriators does not undermine the reasonable efforts
requirement because the trade secret owner must prove some
measure of reasonable efforts as part of its prima facie case.
Another form of disclosure that tends not to be treated
harshly under trade secret la, but that often results in the loss of
trade secrecy, concerns accidental disclosures ("Type II
disclosures"). According to longstanding trade secret doctrine
in the U.S., a trade secret owner who accidentally discloses
trade secrets to a third party may be able to avoid the trade
secrecy disqualifying effects of his inadvertence if he acts
quickly to prevent further dissemination of the information.1 78
Pursuant to the UTSA, a loss of trade secrecy will not result,
and the third party possessor of the accidentally acquired
information may be liable for trade secret misappropriation,
unless the third party changed its position before receiving
notice of the accidental disclosure.1 79 Significantly, in
situations where notice is timely received by the third party, the
actual transfer or disclosure of the information to the third
party is not counted as a trade secrecy waiving event.180
The third type of trade secret disclosure ("Type III
disclosure") relates less to the actor who caused the disclosure
and more to the extent and public nature of the disclosure.
Specifically, it examines whether the subject information was
(at the time of the alleged misappropriation) "generally

those trades secrets in some situations where they have subsequently been
disclosed).
178 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758 (1939).
179 UTSA § 1(2)(ii)(C); see also MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21,

§

7.02[2][b].
"s See Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (analyzing
effect of inadvertent disclosure made in e-discovery context).
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known."' 8 1 Underlying this type of disclosure is the wellestablished principle that intellectual property laws cannot be
used to protect information that is in the public domain. 8 2 An
early recognition of this concept by the U.S. Supreme Court
was in a patent case, Graham v. John Deere, where the Court
stated: "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available."1 83 Under trade secret law, protection is not available
for information that has already been disclosed to the public
either by the putative trade secret owner or another, including a
misappropriator. 8 4 Conceptually, Type III disclosures are
broader than Type I or II disclosures because there is no
recognized basis upon which to limit the consequences of
broad disclosures of information, other than possibly to restrict
what is considered "generally known." 85 However, under
longstanding trade secret doctrine, "generally known" includes

&

" See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("If an
individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to
protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly
discloses the secret, his property right is extinguished." (citing Harrington v.
Natl. Outdoor Adver. Co., 196 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1946)); MILGRIM
BENSEN, supra note 21, § 1.01[2].
112 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc, 489 U.S. 141, 156
(1989) ("[W]e have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears
and Compco that ideas once placed before the public without the protection
of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without significant restraint.").
113 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
11 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
115 See discussion supra Part V.C (discussing Type I disclosures); Rowe,
supra note 28, at 16.
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information that is not only made known to the general public
but also that which is known within discrete industries.' 8 6
Another form of a trade secrecy disqualifying
disclosure ("Type IV disclosures") relates to the "readily
ascertainable" language of the UTSA and is another example
of how the definition of disclosure under trade secret law is
fairly broad in defining the categories of information that do
not qualify for trade secret protection. 187 While lay definitions
of disclosure are often equated with broad, public
dissemination, the concept that information might be readily
ascertainable is narrower and, therefore, results in more trade
secrecy disqualifying disclosures.
It recognizes that
information may not be generally known by the public or
within an industry but may still be "disclosed" for trade secret
purposes if it can be easily found in publicly accessible
materials, such as scientific journals, books, or on websites,
even if no one has actually accessed the information. 8 8
Elizabeth Rowe has explained that, in practice, courts often
conflate "readily ascertainable" with "generally known" and

186

UTSA

§ 1 (1985) Comment ("The language 'not being generally known

to the public or to other persons' does not require that information be
generally known to the public for trade secret rights to be lost. If the
principal person who can obtain economic benefit from information is
aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal, for example,
may be unknown to the general public but readily known within the foundry
industry.").
187 See UTSA § 1(4)(i). Some states, most notably California, do not
analyze the ascertainability of information as part of plaintiffs prima facie
proof of trade secrecy, but rather, frame the issue as a defense. See CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 3426.1(d). This distinction does not affect the current
discussion, however, because it concerns the broader and more abstract
issue of what constitutes "disclosed" information under trade secret law.
188 UTSA § 1 (1985) Comment ("Information is readily ascertainable if it is
available in trade journals, reference books, or published materials.").
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that a good way to think about the two concepts is that
information is disclosed under trade secret law when it is either
"known or knowable."1 89 Generally, the ease with which
information is knowable is the dividing line between whether
information loses its trade secret status immediately upon
becoming ascertainable, or whether it only loses its trade secret
status when it has actually been found or reversed engineered
and thereafter becomes "generally known."1 90
The fifth type of disclosure ("Type V disclosure")
concerns information that would otherwise be a trade secret
except that it is disclosed through no fault of the trade secret
owner by the "rightful" acts of others, for instance, if others
acquire the trade secrets through reverse engineering or
independent development.191 If the acts of reverse engineering
and independent development are followed by a disclosure of
the resulting information in a manner that makes it generally
known or readily ascertainable, then the putative trade secret
owner's rights in the same information no longer exist. A key
reason for this rule is that the ability of individuals and
companies to engage in reverse engineering and independent
development is what differentiates trade secret protection from
patent protection, thereby preventing state trade secret law

1'9 Rowe, supra note 28, at 16-18. The broad definition of "readily
ascertainable" information to include information that is knowable but not
yet generally known is similar to the "in a printed publication" standard of
patent law-which applies a very expansive definition of prior art-holding
that information counts as patent disqualifying prior art if it is "sufficiently
accessible, at least to the public interested in the art, so that such a one by
examining the reference could make the claimed invention without further
research or experimentation." In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir.1986).
190 See infra text accompanying note 191 (discussing Type V disclosures).
191 See MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 21, § 7.02(1) (describing the nonliability of the "honest" discoverer).
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from being preempted by federal patent law.1 92 It is also
consistent with the general goal of promoting the dissemination
of information and the flourishing of the public domain.
Because there is nothing "wrong" with the acts of reverse
engineering or independent development (except with respect
to patented inventions, and possibly breach of contractual
restrictions), public policy does not demand a narrow definition
of disclosure with respect to Type V disclosures, and
disclosures of this sort are conceptually broader than the first
four types of disclosures described above.
Lastly, as discussed in Part IV, the meaning of
disclosure under trade secret law also arises with respect to
owner-initiated disclosures ("Type VI disclosures"). While
such acts might result in information becoming generally
known (a Type III disclosure) or readily ascertainable (a Type
IV disclosure), the public availability of the information is
arguably not required when a trade secret owner voluntarily
transfers information to a third party without first establishing a
duty of confidentiality. This is because of the various functions
of the reasonable efforts requirement, including the notice, due
process, and legitimacy functions, discussed supra.193 A broad
definition of disclosure with respect to voluntary, nonaccidental owner-initiated acts is also consistent with notions
of fairness and judicial efficiency. If a trade secret owner is not
willing to engage in reasonable efforts to protect its allegedly
valuable information, why should society intervene to protect
it? Limits on the scope of trade secret protection (and by
extension broad definitions of disclosure) also help prevent the
use of trade secret litigation for anti-competitive purposes. The
fact that a company did not engage in pre-litigation efforts to

192

See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974).

193 See supra Part H.A.

Vol. 19

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF

LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 01

2014

Sandeen, Lost vi the Cloud: Infomatron Flons aiid the Implcations of
Cloud Computagfor Trade Seciet Publcato,

71

protect its alleged secrets can suggest that its lawsuit is being
used as a means to stifle competition rather than as a means to
protect valuable trade secrets.
The various definitions of trade secrecy destroying
disclosures under existing trade secret law can be diagramed as
follows in Table 1:
Type of Disclosure
I.
Wrongful
II.
Accidental
III. Gen. Known
IV. Read. Ascert.
V.
ID and RE
VI. Voluntary

Actor
Misappropriator
T/S Owner
T/S Owner or Other
T/S Owner or Other
T/S Owner or Other
T/S Owner

Concept of Disclosure
Broad
Broad
Broader
Broader
Broader
Broadest

Table 1.

While the foregoing categorization of disclosure principles
under existing trade secret law may seem harsh, it is consistent
with the purposefully limited and fleeting nature of trade secret
protection and similar definitions of disclosure in other areas of
law. In particular, most other areas of law are similarly harsh
with respect to the treatment of owner-initiated disclosures of
information and, therefore, they fail to provide useful models
for a narrower conception of disclosure under trade secret law.
For instance, the issue of disclosure arises in patent
cases because of the essential rule that a patent will not be
granted for an invention that already exists in the "prior art."1 94
The underlying purpose of this requirement is to reward truly
"new" inventions and to preclude information from being
removed from the public domain. In this way, it is similar to

194

See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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the generally known and readily ascertainable requirements of
trade secret law. As Robert Merges detailed in a recent article,
there are several different definitions of (patent-disqualifying)
disclosure under patent law that range from "widespread
dissemination" on one end of the spectrum of disclosure to
merely "a move away from complete secrecy."1 95 Which patent
definition of disclosure applies generally depends upon who is
engaging in the act of disclosure and the form and manner of
the disclosure.
Although it remains to be seen whether the recently
enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the AIA) will
narrow patent law's conceptions of disclosure,1 96 under
longstanding patent doctrine known as the Metallizing
Engineering doctrine, a patent owner's act of using an
invention in private in a manner that does not actually disclose
&

the invention to the public can forfeit patent protection.1 97 As
explained in Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing
Auto PartsCo:
[I]t is a condition upon an inventor's
right to a patent that he shall not exploit his
discovery competitively after it is ready for
patenting; he must content himself with either
secrecy, or legal monopoly. . . . [I]f he goes
beyond that [grace period without filing a patent
application], he forfeits his right regardless of

195

See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERK.

TECH. L.J. 1023, 1036 (2012).
196 See, e.g., Paul Morgan, The Ambiguity in Section 102(A)(1) of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, 2011 Patently-O Pat. L.J. 29, 30 (2011);
Merges, supra note 195, at 1023.
1' Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946).
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how little the public may have learned about the
invention ... .1 98
Similarly, in Egbert v. Lippnan, the Supreme Court
considered whether the use of corset-stays by the inventor's
girlfriend for a period over two years constituted a
patentability-destroying "public use" even though the invention
was not actually visible to the public.1 99 In finding that the acts
of the inventor constituted a patent-barring public use, the
Court in Egbert set forth the following three principles:
[1.] [T]o constitute a public use of an
invention[,] it is not necessary that more than
one of the patented articles should be publicly
used[;]
[2.] [W]hether the use of an invention is
public or private does not necessarily depend
upon the number of persons to whom its use is
known [; and]
[3.] [S]ome inventions are by their very
character only capable of being used where they
cannot be seen or observed by the public eye.2 00
An underlying purpose of the foregoing principles is to
prevent an inventor from "sleeping on his rights" while the
knowledge in the field of the invention advances around him
and then, after a year or more of use of the invention, claiming

19
1
200

Id. (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829)).
See Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).
Id.
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a right to a patent. 20 1 In effect, the public use bar forces
inventors to file their patent applications sooner rather than
later so that the public can benefit from the disclosures that are
made in the patent application. If inventors use their
inventions, but do not wish to make disclosures that are
accessible to the public, then they forfeit their rights to a patent
unless a patent application is timely filed.2 02
Pre-1989 copyright law also demonstrates that courts
have long been unsympathetic to claims that a broad definition
of disclosure with respect to owner-initiated disclosures will
result in a forfeiture of valuable intellectual property rights.
First, as detailed by Diane Zimmerman, copyright law in the
U.S. used to have an explicit disclosure requirement in the
form publication or registration, the latter being due to the
deposit requirement. 203 Also, before March 1, 1989, U.S.
copyright law provided that copyrights would not attach to
works of authorship that were published without the requisite

Id. at 337.
References in patent law to "secret prior art" concerns the impact of
pending (and unpublished) patent applications and the prior inventions of
others and not the "secret" uses made by an inventor himself. See C.
Douglas Thomas, Secret PriorArt-Get Your PrioritiesStraight!, 9 HARv.
J. L. & TECH. 147, 173-74 (1996). With respect to individuals who are not
the inventors of a "secret" invention, patent law does not count such "secret
prior art" as prior art unless it meets the statutory definition of "prior art."
Id. Thus, such individuals may be able to obtain a patent for the invention,
but the inventor who used it secretly cannot (at least under pre-AIA law).
Id.
203 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Trade Secrets and the "Philosophy" of
201

202

Copyright: A Crash of Cultures, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 299 (Rochelle C.

Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011) (discussing the traditional
disclosure purposes of U.S. copyright law).
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notice of copyright. 204 Like the notice function of the
reasonable efforts requirement of trade secret law, one of the
purposes of this requirement was to put members of the public
on notice of copyrights so that they could avoid infringing
those rights. This was a stringent rule with few exceptions,
despite the resulting forfeiture of valuable rights. 205
Another area of law where public policy considerations
have operated to create a broad definition of disclosure with
respect to the act of an information owner is under the third
party doctrine of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
generally recognizes that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that has been voluntarily disclosed to a
third party. 206 This doctrine was first recognized with respect to
oral communications in a series of cases decided in the 1950s

2

17 U.S.C. § 10 (repealed 1978).

205 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT

§

6:36 (2014) ("Section 10

of the 1909 Act provided: 'Any person entitled thereto by this title may
secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of
copyright required by this title.' The word 'may' was not discretionary;
absent application of the savings clause in Section 21 or judicial tolerance
for immaterial errors, the omission, imperfection, or misplacement of the
notice resulted in loss of protection." (internal citations omitted)).
206 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.

REV. 561 (2009) (explaining and defending the third party doctrine of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). But see Stephen E. Henderson, The
Timely Demise of the Fourth Anendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L.

REV. BULL. 39 (2011) (urging a more nuanced view of the Fourth
Amendment's third party doctrine); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Hone
on the Web and Other Fourth Anendment Inplications of Tecnosocial

Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011) (arguing against an "aggressive" view
of the Fourth's Amendment's third party doctrine particularly with respect
to the transfer of information to "Internet intermediaries."); see also
Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Anendment, 96 IOWA L. REV.

581 (2011) (urging that a distinction be made between disclosures to an
automated machine and a human being).
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and 1960s. 207 The first of these cases was Hoffa v. United
States, in which the Court held that voluntary statements made
by Jimmy Hoffa to a "secret informer" did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 208 Since Hoffa, the third party doctrine of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been extended to a
variety of non-oral communications. In U.S. v. Miller, it was
extended to personal documents and records. 209 In Smith v.
Maryland, the Supreme Court relied upon the doctrine in
finding that the use of a pen register to record all outgoing
phone numbers on a telephone line was not an improper seizure
of information. 2 10 More recently, the doctrine has been used as
the basis for finding that there was no reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to e-mail to/from records, - personal
online data,2 12 ISP subscriber information, 2 13 and e-mails and
other documents stored by an ISP.2 14

Finally, although there is strong public policy behind
the attorney-client privilege, it does not provide absolute

See Tokson, supra note 206, at 597 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 303 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U. S. 747, 751-55 (1952))
20s See Hoffa, 385 U.S.
at 303.
209 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
210 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979). But see Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (recognizing a privacy right in data
stored in and accessible via a cellphone and finding no exception for a
warrantless search of a cellphone incident to a lawful arrest).
211 See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). But see
Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007).
212 See Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 183 (D. Conn.
2005); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan.
207

2000).
213
214

See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008).
See Rehberg v. Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1282 (11th Cir. 2010).
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protection for information shared between an attorney and his
client. The holder of the confidential information can lose
protection through either overt or inadvertent acts involving the
sharing of information with third parties to the attomey-client
relationship. 215 Under the "strict approach" of waiver of the
attomey-client privilege, if protected information is provided
to a third party, the attorney-client privilege is lost.2 16 While
there are exceptions to the strict rule, they are limited. First,
disclosures that are made to necessary agents of the attorney do
not necessarily waive the attorney-client privilege.2 17 Second,
for a waiver of the privilege to apply, the disclosures must
ordinarily be knowing and intentional acts. If the disclosure of
otherwise privileged or protected information was inadvertent,
a waiver of protection will not be found unless it appears that
the acts of the discloser reflect gross negligence or a failure to
take reasonable precautions. 2 18 In places that follow the
"lenient approach," the client's subjective intent to waive will
be considered.2 1 9 Courts that take a "middle ground approach"
will examine the circumstances and generally consider the

See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
(5th ed. 2012); John T. Hundley,
Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-FederalLaw,
159 A.L.R. FED. 153 (2000).
216 See Vincent S. Walkowiak & Thomas J. Leach, Loss of Attorney-Client
Privilege Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Documents, in
215

WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 398-407

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND
DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 385 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 2008); see

also EPSTEIN, supra note 215, at 398-407.
217 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mrozek, 657 A.2d 997, 999 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (finding that a lawyer's secretary is an attorney subordinate, with
whom communications can be protected by attorney-client privilege).
2
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 279
(M.D.N.C. 1992) (holding that certain disclosures should be considered
intentional when they result from gross negligence).
219 Walkowiak & Leach, supra note 216.
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following factors to determine if an inadvertent disclosure
should count as a waiver: (1) the reasonableness of the
precautions to prevent the inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time
taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the
extent of disclosure; and (5) the overriding issue of fairness. 2 20
In summary, although a legal maxim states that the "the
law abhors a forfeiture," 2 2 longstanding principles of law in a
variety of fields demonstrate that there are times when other
policy considerations override concerns about the loss of
confidentiality. Thus, applicable policy considerations should
be taken into account when considering whether to narrow
existing definitions of disclosure under trade secret law,
particularly since such narrowing will result in less information
being available for public use.
D. Distinguishing Between "Disclosures" and "Mere
Transfers"
The foregoing examination of disclosure principles
under various areas of law-including existing trade secret
law-does not provide an obvious or immediate answer to the
question of how disclosure is to be defined (or redefined) with
respect to trade secrets stored in the cloud. If anything, it
reveals a strong public policy in favor of the waiver of
applicable protections whenever an information owner
voluntarily discloses information to a third party. As with the
description of the third party doctrine of trade secret law,
discussed supra,2 2 2 some may question the foregoing

220

See EPSTEIN, supra note 215, at 442-52; Walkowiak & Leach, supra

note 216.
221 See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE
222 See supra Part IV.
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categorization of disclosure principles and argue for a narrower
definition of disclosure with respect to voluntary, nonaccidental owner-initiated acts. However, even if such acts are
categorized as Type I disclosures, there is still a risk that trade
secrets will be lost when they are stored in the cloud, as the
victims of alleged misappropriators know all too well. 223

Another option is to create a new, narrower definition
of disclosure that would apply to cloud-based information
sharing (a Type <I disclosure, if you will).2 24 Like the Internet

service providers that preceded them, cloud storage services
are apt to argue that a special definition of disclosure is needed
to ensure the flourishing of the cloud computing industry,
otherwise individuals and businesses will be reluctant to store
their information in the cloud.
However, there is a risk that
any change in the definition of disclosure that is designed to

223 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Va. 1995).

2
See generally Rowe, supra note 28 (addressing the problem of
disclosures over the Internet and proposing a test for limiting such
disclosures); see also Bruce T. Adkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the
Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL.

&

L. REV. 1151, 1193 (1996) (suggesting that a "right of privacy" should be
recognized for certain disclosures over the Internet).
225 The cloud computing industry joined together to make a similar
argument in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., which
was recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the majority opinion in
Aereo, Justice Breyer suggests that the solution to the perceived concerns of
the cloud computing industry is for it to petition Congress, citing the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act as an example of an industry-sponsored solution
to perceived problems posed by new technologies. See Am. Broad. Co., Inc.
v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Brief of Computer
Communications Industry Association and Mozilla Corporation as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
available
at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/13-461_resp-amcuccia-moz.authcheckdam.pdf.
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solve the cloud storage problem will have broader implications
for trade secret law and practice. In particular, as discussed
supra, a change in the definition of disclosure could render the
reasonable efforts requirement superfluous and undermine the
important notice and due process functions of that
requirement. 2 2 6 Additionally, while there is a greater "policy of
disclosure" under patent law than trade secret law, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Kewanee recognized a disclosure purpose in
trade secret law. 2 27 Any narrowing of the definition of
disclosure under trade secret law would, arguably, be
inconsistent with that purpose.
On the other hand, the law does not exist in a vacuum and
consideration must be given to technological developments that
change how individuals and businesses interact. As Professor
Katherine Strandburg explained in an article On the On the
other hand, the law does not exist in a vacuum and
consideration must be given to technological developments that
change how individuals and businesses interact. As Professor
Katherine Strandburg explained in an article concerning the
third party doctrine of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
"[C]ourts should adopt an approach of technosocial continuity,
recognizing that intertwined technological and social changes
require not only the protection of privacy in conventional
social contexts against technological intrusions, but also the

226 See supra text accompanying note 172.
227 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974)

("Another problem that would arise if state trade secret protection were
precluded is in the area of licensing others to exploit secret processes.
The holder of a trade secret would not likely share his secret with a
manufacturer who cannot be placed under binding legal obligation to
pay a license fee or to protect the secret. The result would be to hoard
rather than disseminate knowledge." (citation omitted)).
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adaptation of privacy protections to the evolution of social
context and governing social norms." 22 8
Similar observations can be made with respect to
changing business methods. With respect to cloud computing,
the capabilities and efficiencies that it provides may simply be
too irresistible and important to individuals and businesses,
thereby raising questions whether and how trade secret law
should adapt to meet this new reality.
Borrowing from recent scholarship related to the Fourth
Amendment's third party doctrine 229 and the idea of a
"taxonomy of privacy,"230 rather than change the existing
definitions of disclosure under trade secret law, an expanded
taxonomy for trade secret law is proposed, whereby a
distinction is explicitly recognized between information flows
that are "disclosures" of trade secrets and information flows
that are "mere transfers" of trade secrets (both of which are
defined infra).23 1 Although this may seem like a distinction
without a difference (i.e., merely relabeling a possible Type <I
disclosure as a "mere transfer"), there are significant factual
differences between "transfers" and "disclosures" that are

22
229

Strandburg, supra note 206, at 680.
See sources cited supra note 206; Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth

Anzendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Teclology, 75 Miss. L.J. 1 (2005);

Stephen

E.

Henderson,

Beyond

the

(Current) Fourth Anzendment:

Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too,

34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007).
230 See Solove, supra note 34, at 485 ("[T]he goal [of this taxonomy] is
simply to define the activities [that affect privacy] and explain why and how
they can cause trouble. The question of when and how the law should
regulate can only be answered in each specific context in which the question
arises.").
231 See infra text accompanying notes 242-243.
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likely to make the labels meaningful to lay people and that are
consistent with common sense.
As the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have begun
to realize, new technologies-including new methods of
conducting business and exchanging information-require
careful consideration of how information flows. 232 Based upon
recent surveys, it appears that a significant percentage of
individuals expect privacy with respect to information that is
stored on third party computer servers, particularly when they
believe that such information will not be read or accessed by a
human being. 2 33 For this reason, among others, it is argued that
courts that attempt to apply the Fourth Amendment in the
Internet context should be careful to distinguish between
disclosures that are made to humans and those that are made to
machines. 234 As the Supreme Court recently explained in a
case involving the alleged unlawful search and seizure of text
messages: "The Court must proceed with care when
considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a
government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating
too fully on Fourth Amendment implications of emerging

See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 758-59 (2010);
Strandburg, supra note 206 (detailing U.S. Supreme Court and state court
decisions where a more nuanced view of third-party disclosures for Fourth
Amendment purposes); see also Henderson, supra note 229.
233 See Tokson, supra note 206, at 621 ("Does all [the recent surveys of
Internet users] mean that a large proportion of Internet users are indifferent
to the privacy of their online data? This Article argues that is does not.
Rather, while users perceive disclosure of their personal information to
humans as a serious privacy harm, they do not consider disclosure to
automated systems alone to be a significant harm.").
232

234 Id.
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technology before its role in society has become clear." 235
Likewise, courts must proceed cautiously to determine what
uses of technology constitute disclosures to a third party that
would trigger the need for a confidentiality agreement under
trade secret law.
In a series of articles, Professor Stephen Henderson
details recent critiques of the Fourth Amendment's third party
doctrine and the cases (mostly state court cases) that have
applied a more nuanced analysis. 236 Rather than simply
advocating for abolishing the third party doctrine as some have
done, he suggests a multi-factored test that would better
account for advances in technology and the expectations of
information owners when using such technology. 237 Borrowing

235

Quon, 560 U.S. at 759.

See Henderson, supra note 206 (setting forth a four-factor test);
Henderson, supra note 229; Stephen E. Henderson, Learningfrom All Fifty
States: How to Apply the Fourth Anzendment and Its State Analogs to
Protect Third PartyInformation from UnreasonableSearch, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 373 (2006); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Anzendment Search, 36
MERCER L. REV. 507 (2005) (setting forth a nine-factor test).
237 Initially, Professor Henderson suggested a nine-factor test, but he has
since reduced the number of proposed factors to four. Henderson, supra
note 206, at 50-51. The four factors that Professor Henderson considers
relevant in the Fourth Amendment context are: (1) the initial transfer of the
information from the person to a third party is reasonably necessary to
participate meaningfully in society or is socially beneficial, including
freedom of speech and association: (2) the information is personal,
including the extent to which it is intimate and likely to cause
embarrassment or stigma is disclosed, and whether outside of the initial
transfer to a third party it is typically disclosed only within one's close
social network, if at all; (3) the information is accessible to and accessed by
nongovernmental persons outside the institution; and (4) existing law
restricts or allows access to and dissemination of the information or similar
information. Id.
236
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from Professor Henderson's list of factors, and after
considering the nature of cloud storage services, the factors that
seem most relevant to the question of whether the act of
transferring information to the cloud should constitute a third
party disclosure for trade secret purposes include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Public policy considerations, including the
importance of specific cloud services;
The purpose of the transfer;
The representations of the cloud storage service;
The objective and subjective expectations of the
uploading party;
The automation and functionality of the cloud
storage service, i.e., whether it is merely a
conduit or passive recipient for stored
information;
The ability of the cloud service provider to
access the information and whether such access
is by a human or a machine; and
Whether the information has actually been
accessed and used.

While it remains to be seen how Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence will develop with respect to information that is
stored in the cloud,2 3 8 the arguments that call for a more
nuanced view of waiver with respect to such information can
be applied to trade secret law as well. This is particularly true
since courts have traditionally applied a stricter definition of

The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Riley v. California
mentions the cloud and suggests that personal information stored in the
cloud is deserving of protection akin to information maintained in one's
house. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
23'
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waiver to trade secrets than to Fourth Amendment rights. 239 if
it is generally easier for a trade secret owner to avoid loss of
trade secrecy than it is for an individual to waive his
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment
(principally because the interests of law enforcement are not
involved), then the arguments for limiting application of the
Fourth Amendment's third party doctrine are stronger when
applied to the thirty party doctrine of trade secret law.
i.

Public Policy

Earlier in this Article, the public policy that underlies
the reasonable efforts requirement and the third party doctrine
of trade secret law was discussed to explain why neither
ignoring the reasonable efforts requirement nor creating a new
definition of disclosure is recommended as workable
refinements to the third party doctrine of trade secret law. 240

In Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Dow
Chemical had no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to "open
areas" observable by aerial surveillance. 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1985).
However, in the trade secret case of E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, the aerial surveillance of a plant under construction was found
to be an act of trade secret misappropriation. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
Similarly, in California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court held that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in information that was placed in
a garbage can that was then placed on a public street for pick-up. 486 U.S.
35 (1988). In contrast, some courts have recognized continued trade secret
protection for trade secrets placed in garbage cans. See, e.g., Tenant Co. v.
Advance Mach. Co., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(analogizing to California's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). While such
cases are probably best explained by the desire to punish the defendants'
"bad acts" in acquiring, disclosing or using plaintiffs trade secrets, they
signify that there are reasons to treat waiver under the Fourth Amendment
different from waiver under trade secret law.
240 See supra Parts III-IV.
239
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The public policy considered here concerns whether a
distinction between a "mere transfer" and a "disclosure" should
be made to accommodate situations, like those existing in the
cloud, where third parties are largely passive possessors of
information. Obviously, the cloud computing industry has a
great interest in this question because the failure to recognize
such a distinction threatens to dissuade the use of the cloud and
to increase transactions costs associated with specially
negotiated confidentiality agreements. But the more important
question concerns the delicate balance between protection of
intellectual property rights and free competition that our
intellectual property rights seek to achieve. 24 1 As Goldilocks
would say, trade secret doctrine cannot be too loose or too
strict, but must be "just right."
Because explicit recognition of a distinction between
mere transfers of information and disclosures of information
would result in more information potentially being protected as
trade secrets, the purposes of trade secret law are furthered. But
these same rationales also apply to proposals which ignore the
reasonable efforts requirement and create a narrower definition
of disclosure; thus, the policy argument in favor of a mere
transfer test cannot simply be "because trade secret protection
is good." Nor can the argument against such a test be "because
the disclosure of ideas and information is good." Rather, while
acknowledging the underlying purposes and limits of trade
secret law, the key question is: What are the additional policy
arguments that tip the balance in favor of the proposal?

See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
150-51 ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive
right to practice the invention for a period of years.").
241
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One argument is that the proposed new test would best
reflect reality and the fact that the operative "acts" are
different. In this regard, the common dictionary definitions of
disclosure and transfer reveal important differences that we
should assume inform the actions of the lay public. According
to Black's Law Dictionary, "disclosure" is defined as "the act
or process of making known something that was previously
unknown; a revelation of facts." 2 42 In contrast, "transfer" is
defined as "to convey or remove from one place or one person
to another; to pass or hand over from one to another." 243 The
key distinction between the two terms is that one necessarily
involves the transfer of knowledge and one does not. In this
regard, "revelation" is defined as something revealed, with
"reveal" being defined as "to make known, manifest."2
Another argument in favor of a "mere transfer" test
concerns a policy expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kewanee v. Bicron Oil that asserts that trade secret
requirements that are too stringent are against public policy
because they prevent the desired leakage of information into
the public domain and because they would force businesses to
spend too much time and effort on protection efforts.245 In his
article, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, Michael Risch put
this policy in economic terms and identified it as the true
"incentive purpose" of trade secret law, namely, the ability of
companies to allocate fewer resources to both the protection
and appropriation of secret resources.2 4 6 The latter benefit

242 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 150, at 531.
243 Id. at 1636.

2 The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language 851
(Encyclopedic ed. 1987).
245 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
246 See Risch, supra note 116, at 5.
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promotes trade secret leakage, which enhances the sharing of
information, while the former benefit reduces the costs of
protection efforts. It is a classic "win-win" as long as the
balance is maintained. Because a "mere transfer" test would be
limited (as described infra),247 it should not upset the balance

by causing either the under-protection of trade secrets assets or
the over-assertion of trade secret rights.
Finally, explicit recognition of a "mere transfer" test
would provide a label and analytical framework for a
distinction that, apparently, has already been made with respect
to "old-school" document storage practices.2 4 8 While many of
the pre-cloud data storage practices involved express promises
of confidentiality, the fact that there has not been more
litigation on this issue suggests that the general public
understands and respects the distinction between mere transfers
and disclosures. Conceptually, such a distinction is also at the
heart of the rule that trade secrets can be embedded in products
that are mass distributed without the trade secret owner losing
trade secret rights merely due to the mass distribution of the
products. 249 The distinction is due to the fact that some massproduced products (or services) are "self-disclosing" and some

247
248
249

See infra Part V.D.ii.
See Goda & Kitsuregawa, supra note 44.
See Eric Douma, Fair Use and Misuse: Two Guards at the Intersection

of Copyrights and Trade Secret Rights Held in Software and Firmware, 42

IDEA 37 (2002). As noted previously, the relevant distinction with respect
to embedded trade secrets relates to the difference between information that
is readily ascertainable and that which must be reverse engineered in order
for trade secrets to be gleaned therefrom. See supra text accompanying note
84; see also Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 68, at 233 ("The issue of trade
secret protection for ideas embodied in products distributed widely without
restriction on use or disclosure would thus seem to turn on how difficult it is
to 'reverse engineer' the product.").
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are not. 250 Thus, the mere transfer or sale of a product in which
trade secrets are embedded does not act as a trade secrecy
destroying disclosure unless the trade secrets are actually
revealed to members of the general public or to experts in the
field.
ii.

Purpose of Transfer

As previously described, the cloud computing industry
is still evolving and the nature of services it offers vary
greatly. 25 For this reason, it is not proposed that a mere
transfer test automatically apply to all instances where
information is stored in the cloud; such an application would be
too loose. Instead, in the same way that the reasonable efforts
requirement of trade secret law requires a case-by-case
assessment of the circumstances, whether the mere transfer test
should apply in any given case will depend on the facts,
including the purpose of the transfer.
Although individuals and companies who use cloud
storage services may simply want a place to store or back-up
digital files, others may use the cloud for purposes that involve
collaboration and the sharing of information. If the people who
are sharing and collaborating are all employees of the same
company or are otherwise under duties of confidentiality with
respect to the shared information, then the trade secret analysis
should focus on the reasonable efforts with respect to those
individuals. If the sharing and collaborating involves third
parties who are not under a duty of confidentiality, the nature

See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 104-06 (defining "selfdisclosing" products).
251 See generally Part II.
250
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and extent of such sharing and collaboration must be closely
examined to determine if there was trade secrecy destroying
disclosures.
This might involve communications
or
collaborations between a trade secret owner and representatives
of a cloud computing service with respect to web-hosting or
SaaS services. In other words, if the purpose of the transfer is
to communicate knowledge from one human being to another,
the same rules that apply to non-cloud communications should
apply and such transfers should constitute disclosures that
waive trade secret protection unless a pre-disclosure obligation
of confidentiality is formed between the trade secret owner and
the third party. However, if the purpose of the transfer is
merely to move information from one place to another, for
instance from an in-house server to a cloud server, the mere
transfer rule should apply.
As a practical matter, the fact-specific nature of the
required analysis means that companies still need to be careful
about where and how they store their trade secrets and who is
allowed to learn or see such secrets. The mere transfer test
would give them the option of using some cloud storage
services in limited ways that do not risk the loss of trade
secrecy. In order to foster the growth of the cloud computing
industry, it is recommended that cloud storage services design
specific services that allow for mere transfers and the
segregation of important trade secret and other proprietary
information.
iii.

Representations of Cloud Storage Services

For reasons that were previously explained, cloud
storage services are often reluctant to promise security for
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information that is stored in the cloud.
They are also apt to
disclaim any liability for the loss of stored information and to
guard against the creation of any express or implied duty of
confidentiality. Thus, their representations are unlikely to serve
as the basis of either a breach of contract or trade secret
misappropriation claim unless sufficient facts exists to support
a finding of an implied duty of confidentiality. This does not
mean, however, that the representations of cloud storage
services would not be relevant in determining whether a
disclosure-as opposed to mere transfer-of trade secrets has
occurred. Without forming the basis of a duty of
confidentiality, the representations of cloud service providers
might reveal important facts, such as whether and to what
extent information that is stored in the cloud is accessed and
used by employees of the cloud service provider or by
others. 253 The representations of cloud service providers may
also provide insights regarding the expectations of trade secret
owners or, as a matter of fairness and equity, justify applying
the mere transfer test in a given case.
In this age of ubiquitous click-wrap agreements and
cyber-hacking activities, one can imagine a scenario where a
company, desiring to comply with the mere transfer test,
carefully investigates the nature of services provided by a
cloud storage service to ensure that its stored information will
not be used or accessed by third parties, only to find out later
that the representations that were made by the cloud storage
service were inaccurate. While the liability limiting provisions
of the click-wrap terms of service agreement may make it
difficult for the company to sue the cloud storage service for

252 See supra text accompanying note 78-91.
253 See, e.g., Google Terns of Service, supra note 8.
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breach of contract or trade secret misappropriation,2 54 an
equitable question arises whether any information that was
revealed to others under such circumstances should lose its
trade secret status. Like the Type I disclosures described above,
assuming that the subject information did not otherwise
become generally known or readily ascertainable, no
information would be removed from the public domain by
applying the mere transfer test in such a situation. Additionally,
the notice and due process functions of the reasonable efforts
requirement are not undermined because the company arguably
engaged in reasonable efforts by first investigating the nature
of the services provided by the cloud storage company and
concluding that a confidentiality agreement was not required
because of the mere transfer test.
iv.

Expectations of the Uploading Party

On the surface, the "expectations of the uploading
party" factor is similar to the just discussed "representations of
the cloud storage provider" factor, but it comes at the issue
from a slightly different angle. A rule of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is that information should not be protected when
the information owner does not have a subjective expectation
of privacy.2 55 In other words, there is a difference between
what an individual actually believed and what he could
reasonably expect based upon applicable social norms.

254 Obviously, the company would have a fraud or false advertising claim

against the cloud storage service, but the fact that third parties accessed or
used information when they were not under a duty of confidentiality also
presents problems with respect to the trade secret status of the information.
255 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
Vol. 19

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 01

2014

Sandeen, Lost vi the Cloud: Infomatron Flons aid the Implcations of
Cloud Compuragfor Trade Secizt Publcato,

93

Pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is only if it is
first established that a person had a subjective expectation of
privacy that the subsequent question of whether the expectation
of privacy was reasonable according to prevailing social norms
can be asked.
The third party doctrine of trade secret law also reflects
subjective and objective aspects. The reasonable efforts
requirement looks for objective evidence in the form of
affirmative efforts to maintain secrecy as evidence, among
other things, of an expectation of secrecy. Pursuant to the
independent requirement of a duty of confidentiality, however,
it also demands that both parties to the information transfer
have the subjective understanding that the information will be
kept confidential.
In the case of alleged "mere transfers" of information to
the cloud, objective evidence of reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy will continue to be important both intra-enterprise at
the trade secret owner's facilities and within the cloud. Thus,
trade secret owners who choose to store information with a
cloud storage service should investigate the level of security
that is provided and take advantage of the various security tools
that are available for stored information. What is conceptually
different under a "mere transfer" test is the necessary
subjective understanding of the cloud storage service. If a
disclosure of trade secrets does not occur, a trade secret owner
should not have to demonstrate that the cloud storage service
had a subjective understanding that the information should be
kept confidential. However, the subjective belief of a putative
trade secret owner would be relevant. For instance, if the
putative trade secret owner did not care whether information

256

See id.
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stored in the cloud was kept confidential, then application of
the mere transfer test is not needed to further an expectation of
confidentiality. If a subjective expectation of confidentiality is
shown, then a deeper analysis is needed to determine if there
was an actual disclosure or only a mere transfer.
v.

Functionality of Cloud Storage Services

How cloud services are established and whether they
include tools to facilitate confidentiality and secrecy is another
factor to consider. Although cloud storage services may be
reluctant to contractually guarantee confidentiality and secrecy,
they often offer functionality that could suggest the act of
storage is a mere transfer of information rather than a
disclosure. In fact, many cloud service providers label and
otherwise differentiate their cloud services by focusing on
functionality and, if a mere transfer test is recognized, they
would be incentivized to engage in more of these efforts.
With respect to functionality, the critical distinction to
be drawn between "mere transfers" and "disclosures" is akin to
the distinction that is drawn between "passive" and "active"
ISPs. In the early days of the Internet, questions arose
concerning the liability of ISPs for the content posted on their
websites, particularly user-generated content, and whether their
online "presence" subjected them to personal jurisdiction in
particular jursidictions. 257 In the same way that cloud storage
services do not want to incur liability related to the terabytes of
information that they store for their customers, ISPs did not
want to be held liable for defamation, copyright infringement,
and other torts related to the vast amount of content posted by

See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (concerning alleged trademark liability of ISP).

257
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their customers. An early theory that, in many cases, limited
the liability of ISPs was that they should not be liable if the
website was "passive" or the ISP was a "mere conduit of
information. 258
As argued by Mathew Tokson in Automation and the
Fourth Aniendinent, this factor should also include an
examination of whether the transfer of information involves
human intervention and, if so, the nature and scope of such
intervention. 259 In this regard, while many cloud services,
particularly storage services, might be highly automated, others
may depend on human interaction that may require knowledge
of customer information. If knowledge is revealed through the
storage of information, then arguably there is a disclosure
rather than a mere transfer.
vi.

Ability of Cloud Service
Access Stored Data

Providers to

For various reasons unrelated to wanting to use (or even
read) stored data, cloud computing services typically reserve
the right to access stored data under specified conditions. 260

251 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Conmc'n Sens.,

Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[I]t does not make
sense to adopt a rule that could lead to liability of countless parties whose
role in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a
system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet.").
259 Tokson, supra note 206, at 601-04 (describing automation on the
Internet).
260 One interesting example comes from a Rackspace blog: "It is
Rackspace's policy that it will not access, transfer or deliver data stored on
servers by Rackspace's customers in response to any government
authorities other than pursuant to a properly issued, lawfld request from
appropriatelaw enforcement officials or other orderfrom a competent body
from the country in which the servers are physically located. This applies
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Should the fact that stored data can be accessed be the test of
disclosure for trade secret purposes, or should a disclosure that
waives trade secret protection only occur when the information
is actually accessed? Should the fact that government officials
might be free to search and seize stored information, or
actually search or seize such information, constitute a
disclosure that waives trade secret protection?
To answer the foregoing questions, it is suggested that a
distinction be drawn between: (1) transferred information that
cannot be accessed by the transferee due to contractual or
technical restrictions; (2) transferred information that can be
accessed by the transferee but is not accessed; (3) transferred
information that can be accessed by the transferee but only for
limited purposes that does not involve the transferee's use of
such information; and (4) transferred information that is
accessed and used by the transferee. It is only the fourth type of
transfer that would (in the absence of a duty of confidentiality)
constitute a trade secret disclosing transfer.
The foregoing questions are also important with respect
to whether a cloud storage service has a legal duty of
confidentiality that may supersede any efforts by it to disclaim
liability for the confidentiality or security of stored
information. This is because the Stored Communications Act
may impose a legal duty of non-disclosure with respect to some

to requests from law enforcement and includes those made under the Patriot
Act. Our customers have full care, custody and control over their servers
and the data that is stored on those servers -Rackspace does not have that
control." Alan Schoenbaum, Your Data is Your Data. Period., RACKSPACE
(June 11, 2013), http://www.rackenspace.cor/blog/your-data-is-your-dataperiod (emphasis added).
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but not all of the listed types of disclosures. 2 6' Specifically, in
cases where the Stored Communications Act applies, cloud
storage services may be precluded from "knowingly divulging"
stored information.
vii.

Whether Access Has Occurred

When trade secret information is seen or used by
another in such a way that the embedded knowledge is revealed
to another human being, it is by definition "disclosed." Thus,
while it is prudent to not designate any one factor as most
important in the disclosure analysis, determining whether
information has been accessed is the obvious first step in
determining whether information was actually seen or used. It
is also a critical factor in preserving the sieve-like quality of
trade secret protection.2 6 2 Although trade secret owners hate it
when trade secrets are lost, trade secret protection is fleeting
for important public policy reasons. If a company is careful, it
can conceivably protect its trade secrets for decades, but they
can also be lost in an instant due to no fault of the trade secret
owner. Because of this reality a lot of resources can be wasted
trying to protect information that others are likely to discover
and disclose anyway. This should motivate companies to

The Stored Communications Act is a Fourth Amendment-like statute
that was designed by Congress to provide a measure of privacy for
information that is handled by an "electronic communication service"
(ECS) and a "remote computing service" (RCS). 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
Where it applies, it prohibits the disclosure of information to law
enforcement without a warrant or in response to a civil subpoena. See
Crispin v. Christian Audiger, Inc. 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971-72 (C.D. Cal.
2010). Due to the specific and relatively narrow definitions of an ECS and
an RCS, unless amended by Congress, it is unlikely to apply to all cloud
storage services. See Robinson, supra note 157, at 1195.
262 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974).
261
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identify their most important trade secrets for special treatment
and carefully limit access to that information, allowing other,
lesser, trade secrets and proprietary information to potentially
leak-out. This not only enriches the public domain, it reflects
the balance that trade secret law seeks to achieve between free
and robust competition and trade secret protection.
If the cloud storage service has not actually accessed,
seen, or used the stored information, then the relationship
between the trade secret owner and the cloud storage service is
irrelevant. However, as noted above, the trier of fact would still
have to examine whether the trade secret owner otherwise
engaged in efforts that were reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain the secrecy of the subject
information. 2 63 With respect to information that is stored in
digital form on a computer or other electronic devices, such
efforts might include the use of passwords and encryption.2 64
E. A Proposed Analytical Framework
Although Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not a
model of clarity,2 6 5 the bifurcated nature of its analysis
provides a potential approach for applying the foregoing
analysis and deciding whether a trade secret owner's act in
storing information with a third party constitutes a "mere
transfer" or a "disclosure." The bifurcated approach of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence first asks whether the challenged

263 See supra Part V.A.
2 See Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets

in a DigitalEnvironment, 49 IDEA 359, 366-68 (2009).
265 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60

STAN. L. REv. 503, 528 (2007).
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governmental action was a search. 6 6 If it was, the second part
of the analysis asks whether the scope and manner of the
search was reasonable. As explained by Orin Kerr, this
bifurcated approach has the advantage of creating some
predictability and clarity for law enforcement personnel.
Importantly, "[d]ividing the Fourth Amendment into two stages
provides considerable certainty by carving out a set of
investigative steps that cannot lead to suppression." 26 7
The analytical approach this Article proposes for use
with respect to alleged trade secret information stored in the
cloud involves a four-step process which, depending on how
the parties and the court wish to structure the case, may
precede or follow a determination whether the subject
information is secret and has independent economic value.26 8
The four steps are as follows:
Step 1: Did Information Flow to a Third Party?
Of course, the third party doctrine of trade secret law is
not implicated unless the alleged trade secret information flows

266

See id.

267

Id.

The plaintiff in a trade secret case has the burden of establishing both the
existence of a trade secret and misappropriation. MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra
note 21, § 16.01[3][a]. With respect to the first issue, the third party
doctrine of trade secret law arises under the reasonable efforts requirement
of trade secret protection, and thus, conceptually, it is the plaintiff's burden
to prove that no trade secrecy destroying third-party disclosures occurred.
This is not how the issue ordinarily arises, however. Usually, the plaintiff
will present evidence of its intra-enterprise reasonable efforts to satisfy its
prima facie case and then it is up to the defendant to find evidence of thirdparty disclosures. If such evidence is found, and the issue is raised in a
motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant, then the issue may
be decided before the plaintiff has to establish secrecy and economic value.
268
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from the trade secret owner to a third party. Rather than
attempting to define who is a third party for purposes of trade
secret law, pre-existing law should be applied to determine this
question. It is clear, however, that the transfer of information
over a private network between servers owned by the trade
secret owner would not count. Also, pursuant to the principles
and policies underlying the Stored Communications Act and
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the use of the Internet (or
another shared network) to transmit information between
servers owned by the trade secret owner should not count. 269
Even though third party facilities are used for the transfer of
information, the transient nature of such transfers should not
trigger the third party doctrine of trade secret law.
More difficult issues may arise with respect to the flow
of information between a trade secret owner and affiliates.
Some affiliates may be closely enough related to the trade
secret owner so that the transfer of information between such
affiliates and the trade secret owner should not trigger the third
party doctrine at all, such as information flows between
employees of a company or between a parent company and its
subsidiaries. However, the third party doctrine would be
triggered when information flows between independent
businesses.
Step 2: What Were the Circumstances, Nature, and Scope
of the Information Flow?
It is at Step 2 where the multi-factored factual analysis
that is discussed above should be applied. If it is concluded that
the information flows only involved "mere transfers," then skip

See The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2012); see
also The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
269
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to Step 4. It is only when a "disclosure" to a third party occurs
that the third party doctrine of trade secret law applies to
require a duty of confidentiality, discussed in Step 3.
Step 3: Did the Third Party Owe a Duty of Confidentiality
to the Trade Secret Owner and Comply with It?
Although this Article is focused on voluntary, nonaccidental, owner-initiated disclosures (described as Type VI
disclosures), in other cases, it may be necessary under this step
to determine if the principles governing a different type of
disclosure apply. With respect to Type VI disclosures, the
question to be examined at this stage is whether the third party
is under an express or implied duty of confidentiality. If a duty
of confidentiality exists, then it must be determined if the third
party complied with that duty by engaging in reasonable efforts
on its end to protect the shared trade secrets. If it did not
comply, the trade secret owner may have a claim against the
third party, but any disclosures by that third party may have
destroyed the trade secrecy status of the information going
forward. If there was no duty of confidentiality, then for the
reasons set forth above, the "disclosure" of information to the
cloud storage service waived the trade secrecy of stored
information.
Admittedly, there is an odd circularity to the order of
the analysis here because, if an express or implied duty of
confidentiality exists, the distinction between "mere transfers"
and "disclosures" is not needed to preserve the trade secrecy of
stored information. Thus, in some cases it may make sense to
consider the existence or non-existence of a duty of
confidentiality first. In other cases, the distinction between
"mere transfers" and "disclosures" may be important even if a
duty of confidentiality exists, for instance, to define the scope
and nature of the third party's duty.
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Step 4: Did the Trade Secret Owner Otherwise Engage in
Reasonable Efforts to Protect Its Trade Secrets?
Regardless of the choices that a trade secret owner
makes concerning the flow of its information, the configuration
of its computer systems, and the nature of its business
relationships, applicable law requires that it institute reasonable
precautions if it wants to protect its trade secrets. Step 3
requires an examination into the reasonable efforts that are
engaged in by a third party when trade secret information is
disclosed to a third party who is under a duty of confidentiality.
In no event, however, do the obligations of a third party, if any,
excuse a trade secret owner from exercising reasonable efforts
of its own. Whether the flow of information to a third party is
considered to be a "mere transfer" or a "disclosure," these
efforts should include affirmative steps that are reasonable
under the circumstances to ensure that the transfer and storage
of information is secure through the use of encryption,
passwords, and similar strategies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

New technologies and new methods of conducting
business always present challenges for the business
community, their legal advisors, and the legal system. The
emergence of cloud computing is no exception. Luckily,
companies are willing to proceed with innovation despite
uncertainties, and lawyers are willing to support their clients'
aspirations by helping them to understand and manage the
associated risks. The goal of this Article was to provide both an
understanding of existing trade secret law and a proposed
solution to the third party doctrine of trade secret law that will
enable better risk management and that will assist courts in
analyzing trade secret disputes that arise in the cloud. Some
trade secrets are bound to be lost in the cloud, but with
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planning, others may be preserved. Hopefully, the analytical
framework set forth above will enable legitimate trade secrets
that are stored in the cloud to be protected while still respecting
both the purposes behind the reasonable efforts requirement of
trade secret law and the balance between trade secret protection
and free competition that underlies existing trade secret
doctrine.
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